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ABSTRACT
The looting of the Iraq National Museum in 2003, the 
subsequent debates regarding responsibility for the looting, and 
questions concerning the appropriate approach to museum 
reconstruction reveal the symbolic power of the museum as an 
institution—a power that history has shown to be capable of triggering 
division, but nonetheless retains tremendous potential for encouraging 
unification.
In the wake of the looting of the Iraq National Museum during 
the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, an analysis of the looters, the materials 
they stole, and the socio-cultural environment permissive to such 
actions reveals that all stakeholders appropriated the museum’s 
holdings and the cultural heritage embodied within for the purpose of 
preserving competing self-interests.
Much debate arose from these events, with the majority of it 
centering on whether the U.S. violated international law and whether a 
theory of cultural nationalism or internationalism is most appropriate for 
the museum’s recovery. This discussion highlights several 
conundrums facing heritage protection and preservation. Dialogue 
over U.S. responsibility for the looting reveals the inadequacy of 
legislation alone in protecting cultural heritage, while debate between 
approaches of cultural nationalism or internationalism as the proper 
path forward reveals a tragic tradeoff between what may be ideal for 
the global community and what may be in the best interests of the 
recovering Iraqi nation.
Despite the museum’s potential to divide, proven many times in 
its relatively short lifespan, it nonetheless retains tremendous future 
potential to unify. This potential must be capitalized upon by scholars 
and policy makers alike to signify a return to normalcy in Iraq and to 
preserve its national identity, diversity, and heritage.
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FIXING WHAT HAS BEEN BROKEN:
The United States’ Actions in the Aftermath of the Looting of the Iraq 
National Museum during the 2003 Invasion
Introduction and Overview
The subject of looting has been studied from numerous angles, 
giving rise to a number of hypotheses concerning the motivations behind it 
and the meaning arising from it. Scholarly literature on this topic has 
identified four components as key contributors to episodes of looting: 
potential looters, an availability of valued goods, an absence of restraining 
factors, and a permissive socio-cultural environment.1 Moreover, three 
distinct types of looting—namely, economic, symbolic, and selective 
looting2—also emerge from the literature.
The phenomenon of looting is problematic because it marks the 
general breakdown of public order. It overturns societal notions of private 
property and generates illicit networks, or bolsters them where they already 
exist, that offend communal notions of legal commerce. Moreover, looting is 
also unsettling because of the long-entrenched economic injustices to which it 
often responds. In the case of cultural property, looting is especially
1 MacGinty, Roger. “Looting in the Context of Violent Conflict: A Conceptualization and
Typology.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), pp. 861-864.
2 MacGinty, pp. 866-868
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disconcerting because it either destroys artifacts themselves or the context 
from which they are drawn, erasing the remnants of centuries of heritage and 
limiting the conclusions that archaeologists may draw from the study of 
material culture.
The looting of the Iraq National Museum during the U.S.-led 
invasion of 2003 is of relevance for all of these reasons. It marked the coming 
of years of insurgency with which the U.S. armed forces and the emerging 
Iraqi government would wrestle, it highlighted the deplorable conditions 
under which much of Iraq’s populace suffered for decades, and it saw the theft 
and destruction of thousands of years’ worth of cultural heritage.
This thesis will examine the looting of the Iraq National Museum 
with an interdisciplinary lens. It will rely less on anthropological and 
ethnographic literature, for this comprises but one avenue of insight into the 
events of April 2003. Instead, it will draw upon domestic and foreign heritage 
professionals; testimony from current and former members of the U.S. 
military, as well as other government agents; international jurisprudence; 
journalistic opinion; and other resources. The resources I found approached 
this topic in a variety of media and genres—newspapers, museum studies 
journals, military history or public management case studies, international law 
arguments, etc. It was my feeling that a more inclusive method could reach a 
wider audience. In contrast to the many sources that fit into one of these
2
channels, this thesis will attempt to integrate them all to address more 
wholistically the legal and policy implications of these tragic events for 
cultural heritage protection.
To this end, the essay will consult sources that examine the 
psychology of looting and apply the findings to the events of April 2003. 
Economists and contemporary historians will paint a picture of what led a 
people to ransack an institution of their cultural heritage. It will look to the 
journalistic coverage from shortly after the looting occurred in order to 
identify recurring themes in the Western reaction, and it will augment this 
with A1 Jazeera reporting to gauge the Middle Eastern response. Amid the 
lamentation that more was not done to protect the museum, this thesis will 
look to jurisprudence and legal opinion to examine what legally could (and 
thus should) have been done to prevent this catastrophe, and pair it with the 
writings of museum and heritage professionals to entertain proposals of what 
may be pursued moving forward by way of museum recovery.
The first section of this thesis will conduct an analysis of the 
looters and the materials they plundered, the lack of prohibitive factors, and 
the permissive socio-cultural environment leading up to the looting of the Iraq 
National Museum during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, and reveal this episode 
of looting to have meaning that is both economic and symbolic.
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Looking to these four contributors and the three types of looting to 
which they lead is revelatory in the case of the Iraq National Museum. As 
expected, all four contributing components were present leading up to the 
2003 looting of the Iraq museum. Notably, these contributing factors gave 
rise to all three types of looting as the museum’s contents were ransacked. An 
analysis of the groups who carried out the looting and the goods that each 
respective group chose to pilfer reveals the episode to be a prime example of 
both economic and selective looting. Simultaneously, looking to the absence 
of restraining factors and the otherwise permissive socio-cultural environment 
reveals these events to exemplify symbolic looting.
In these events, we witness distinct stakeholders—invading U.S. 
forces, outgoing Baathist officials, museum staff, and Iraqi citizens—having 
different competing understandings of cultural heritage, as well as competing 
interests in its preservation (or lack thereof). This section will also show that 
the conflicts among these four groups over the cultural heritage within the 
museum centered on furthering their own competing interests.
The second and third sections of this thesis will examine the debate 
that has arisen from these events. I first argue that questions concerning 
potential U.S. violations of international law reveal the inadequacies of 
modem legislation in protecting cultural heritage. I further maintain that 
discussions of the possible museum reconstruction are rooted in cultural
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internationalism or nationalism, and these debates reveal a bitter tradeoff 
between acting in the best interest of the global community or that of the 
recovering Iraqi nation.
While there is much debate over whether the U.S. violated 
international law by failing to protect the museum from looting, both sides of 
the debate enjoy a degree of representation within the literature on the topic. 
The second section of this thesis will survey a diversity of opinion to show 
that, though the reasons justifying their positions vary, several common 
themes do emerge.
The primary arguments for the position that the United States did 
indeed violate international law focus on readings the intent behind relevant 
international tenets, as well as a spirit of national harmony with international 
standards. The majority of opinion against U.S. actions constituting a 
violation of international law focuses on a more literal reading of the law and 
obligations under it, as well as a tendency toward minimal compliance with 
relevant doctrine. This study will reveal that relevant legislation at the 
national and international levels is not only flawed, but is an inherently 
insufficient means to protect cultural heritage. Rather, such legislation must 
be augmented by a national desire and legitimate conviction to protect cultural 
property in order for any heritage laws to be effective in accomplishing this.
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The next section will show that the two predominant schools of 
thought relating to material culture and preservation are cultural nationalism 
and cultural internationalism. A culturally nationalistic approach centers on 
the artifacts belonging to the source nation and appeals to a sense of national 
heritage, while a culturally internationalist approach centers on the artifacts 
belonging to the world as a whole and appeals to a sense of global heritage.
Each has its pros and cons, as well as a number of scholars who 
support it as the most appropriate path forward for the Iraq National Museum. 
Approaches rooted in cultural nationalism tend to be better for the source 
country of the artifacts. Among others, benefits include economic 
development from domestic and international heritage tourism, creating or 
fostering a national identity, providing a social education in what is deemed 
an ideal citizenry, and preserving the future of domestic scholarship. 
Approaches rooted in a sense of cultural internationalism are often safer for 
the artifacts when the source nation is poorer. They can be preferable for both 
the field of study as well as the global community, as they can help ensure a 
more widespread exposure to the artifacts and thus help foster a sense of 
worldwide heritage.
Despite each school of thought enjoying a considerable degree of 
support, the prevailing trend in modern years has been to lean toward 
internationalism. Not surprisingly, the literature concerning the reconstruction
6
of the Iraq Museum since its 2003 looting has been overwhelmingly in favor 
of approaches deeply rooted in a sense of cultural internationalism.
An unfortunate tradeoff, however, emerges from this debate. 
Artifacts may be better protected and conserved if removed from areas 
plagued by violent strife. They may also be safer in richer nations that can 
afford to employ more effective preservation techniques. While this can be 
desirable for the artifacts as objects themselves and heritage preservation as a 
field of study, it may prove damaging to the autonomy, sovereignty, national 
identity, and long-term cultural heritage of the nation from which they hail. 
While the heritage may enjoy a larger audience and thus foster a wider 
appreciation for Iraq and Middle Eastern culture under the wing of cultural 
internationalism, the benefits for the Iraqi populace—a strengthened national 
identity and a social education in patriotism and desirable citizenship—could 
be sacrificed in times of calamity when the need for such cohesion is keenest.
With these tradeoffs in mind, the fourth section of this thesis will 
argue that museums have a tendency to be employed as political instruments, 
with the Iraq National Museum being no exception. Ever since its inception, 
the Iraq National Museum has had a long history of being employed as a 
political tool by British, Baathist, and most recently both American 
stakeholders and the new Iraqi government. It will call attention to the 
museum’s proven track record of being used to foster a spirit of division, and
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highlight the recurring theme of stakeholders appropriating its collections and 
the heritage they embody to further their own interests. It will also argue that, 
despite this history, the museum nonetheless retains a tremendous potential to 
sow the seeds of a future unification.
This section will recount how use of the museum as an instrument 
of politics began with the British formation of modern-day Iraq and 
installation of the Faisal monarchy, a time during which Gertrude Bell exerted 
a great deal of influence on the formation of the museum and its evolution 
within the country’s Ministry of Public Works. It will also communicate how 
this practice continued with the Baathist regime’s use of the museum to 
legitimize their claim to power by way of connecting itself to the past glories 
of ancient Babylon. This section will also show that, during the years of 
insurgency that followed the initial invasion, parts of Iraq’s fledgling 
government appropriated the museum for the purpose of sowing anti­
occupation discord, actively drawing the distinction between Islamic artifacts 
and Mesopotamian artifacts and granting permission to loot the former but not 
the latter.
All the while, outside of Iraq, the museum was also used as a 
device to either condemn or justify U.S. foreign policy amid the 2003 
invasion. Opponents and critics of U.S. foreign policy used the museum and 
its plight as a device to condemn U.S. war efforts, while those supporting the
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war, on the other hand, voiced an alarmingly wide array of tenuously 
supported narratives concerning the looting to justify the U.S. decision to 
invade.
Despite this potential to divide, which has been proven in the Iraq 
National Museum’s relatively short lifespan, the last section will argue that 
the museum and its collections nonetheless retains a rich potential to signify a 
return to normalcy within Iraq, acting as a weather vane of progress in 
reconstruction, and to foster an Iraqi national identity and sense of pride. It 
can give context to the many eras of strife within Iraqi heritage, a context 
which can then communicate broader truths to the citizenry concerning broad 
elements such as Mesopotamian roots, the Islamic faith, periods of British 
colonialism and early nationhood, years of Baathist alienation, and the U.S. 
invasion and subsequent new government.
Museums are symbols of power, so it stands to reason that the Iraq 
National Museum can legitimize a people just as it has legitimized regimes. 
This can, in turn, ensure long-term preservation of artifacts and longevity of 
scholarship, as a profound resonance with the populace and a collective 
identity or conscience are the first steps in securing the survival of material 
culture.
Rather than merely propping up the ruling party’s historical 
narrative, the museum can also give special voice to Iraq’s long overlooked
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diversity, even if respective historic narratives are conflicting. This can 
include attention to the deeply felt tribal differences and religious differences 
ignored by the United States in its war planning. By virtue of predating 
modern-day strife, the Mesopotamian period stands poised as a solid common 
ground upon which to begin the process of unifying the diverse elements that 
comprise Iraqi society.
If national museums are to be considered an outward sign of 
independent nations, then the reopening and proper functioning of the Iraq 
National Museum will signal this to the Iraqi people and to the world, a notion 
the U.S. would do well to support. After all, if this is the United States’ goal 
in Iraq—to return the nation to a pre-totalitarian state of affairs—then the 
museum’s restoration and proper functioning is equally in the best interests of 
the U.S. as of the Iraqis. This unifying potential can and must be capitalized 
upon by both policy makers and cultural heritage professionals alike in order 
to signify a return to normalcy in Iraq, to solidify its modern twenty-first- 
century national identity, as well as to preserve its rich diversity and ancient 
heritage well into future generations.
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I. The Economic and Symbolic Significance of the 2003 Looting of the
Iraq National Museum
The Looting of the INM
Operation Iraqi Freedom—the U.S.-led mission to invade Iraq and 
ouster Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime—officially began on March 
20, 2003. The first U.S. forces entered the capital of Baghdad on April 5, but 
left vacant the Iraq National Museum compound, home of the world’s largest 
collection of Mesopotamian artifacts,3 from April 9-12 during the siege. 
During this time, the museum was looted, with hundreds of thousands of 
antiquities being taken in three devastating waves—though there was likely 
some overlap between these waves of theft4—that shocked and enraged the 
global community.
The first wave began early on April 10, as a group of organized 
professional thieves with information on the location of highly-prized 
antiquities entered the compound. It is currently believed that these 
professionals entered Iraq just before the war in anticipation of capitalizing
3 Gerstenblith, Patty. “From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural
Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century.” Georgetown Journal of International 
Law. Vol. 37 (2006), p. 288.
4 Vreeke, Dennis. “The Looting of the National Museum of Iraq, Baghdad: How Cultural
Heritage Became War Booty.” McGill University (20 November 2006), p. 3.
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upon the “the opportunity of a lifetime,”5 perhaps stealing and selling “big- 
ticket items” as part of a long-standing arrangement dating as far back as the 
First Gulf War.6 This group sought specific pieces and took some of the most 
valuable items from the museum’s public galleries,7 as if they were working 
from a shopping list.8
The second wave of looting took place later that same day, as a 
group of ordinary citizens focused mainly on furniture and electronic 
equipment, and attempted to set fire to the administrative and offices, labs, 
and record rooms.9 This second group also entered the museum’s public 
galleries and removed thirty-four artifacts from the walls and out of display 
cases, highly-prized items that were too large for the museum staff to have 
moved to safety ahead of time, including the famous 5,000-year-old Sacred 
Vase of Warka, as well as the over 4,000-year-old Bassetki Statue, one of the 
two Ninhursag Bulls, and the Entemena Statue.10 This wave of looters also 
stole indiscriminately from the museum’s more accessible above-ground
5 Rothfield, Lawrence, ed. Antiquities under Siege: Cultural Heritage Preservation after the
Iraq War. Lanham: AltaMira Press (2008), pp. 40-41.
6 Bogdanos, Matthew and William Patrick. Thieves of Baghdad: One Marine’s Passion for
Ancient Civilizations and the Journey to Recover the World’s Greatest Stolen Treasures. 
New York: Bloomsbury (2005), p. 215.
7 Hitchcock, Ann. ‘Through the Fog of War in Iraq: Lessons Learned in Heritage
Preservation.” The George Wright FORUM. Vol. 20, No. 4 (2003), p. 29.
8 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 20
9 George, Donny and McGuire Gibson. “The Looting of the Iraq Museum Complex.”
Catastrophe: The Looting and Destruction of Iraq’s Past. Chicago: The Oriental 
Institute Museum (2008), p. 21.
10 George and Gibson, p. 23
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storage rooms, taking items such as the Warka Mask and stripping the 4,500- 
year-old Ur Lyre (one of the world’s oldest surviving stringed musical 
instruments) of its gold inlays.11 The true number of items taken may 
unfortunately never be known since these areas had yet to be fully inventoried 
by the museum staff.
The third and final wave, like the first, was composed of 
professional thieves, or perhaps museum insiders. This group “had intimate 
knowledge of the museum and its storage practices” and “targeted high-value 
items in unmarked cabinets.”12 A1 Jazeera coverage of the looting explicitly 
addressed the possibility of museum insiders playing a role in the theft, 
implying that staff members who disappeared during war were to blame.13 
Other Middle Eastern journalistic pieces also mentioned this possibility, albeit 
briefly and as an afterthought to U.S. culpability.14 In any event, this group 
broke into areas of the museum whose location was known to few and took 
with them some 5,000 pieces of jewelry and 5,000 cylinder seals from early 
historical periods.15 These stone cylinder seals were used to sign wet clay 
tablets and represent one of the earliest forms of writing, recording many
11 George and Gibson, p. 25
12 Hitchcock, p. 29
13 Priceless museum items go missing. (2003, September 11). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
14 History ... another victim of occupation. (2003, October 23). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
15 George and Gibson, p. 21
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aspects of ancient life, including religious myths, laws and court cases, trade 
practices, etc.16 Museum staff returned and finally secured the complex on 
April 12 as throngs of journalists arrived, before United States forces 
eventually arrived on April 16 to overtake security.
The looting of the museum ignited a media fire storm. Reports 
from journalists and heritage professionals of the total number of items stolen 
were initially overstated and varied widely immediately following the 
securing of the museum.17 Depending on the source, somewhere between 
50,000 and 170,000 items were taken in the looting.18 These numbers differ 
wildly, largely as a result of the emotional fever pitch from archaeologists.19 
These stories all accused the U.S. of acting unilaterally while ignoring 
international law governing the protection of cultural heritage. Reporting 
from sensationalist press and analysis from journalists ignorant of the social, 
cultural, or political realities of the situation20 was also at play.
16 Gerstenblith, pp. 273-274
17 Hitchcock, p. 33
18 Lawler, Andrew. “Mayhem in Mesopotamia.” Science. Vol. 301 (August 2003), p. 585.
19 Joffe, Alexander H. “Museum Madness in Baghdad.” The Middle East Quarterly. Vol.
XI, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 31.
20 Cordoba, Joaquin Maria. “On the Iraq Museum and Other Assaults: Brief News about the
Plundering of Iraqi Museums and the Systematic Looting of Iraqi Archaeological 
Heritage.” Isimu: Revista sobre Oriente Proximo y Egipto en la Antigiiedad. Vol. 3
(2000), pp. 20-21.
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Although these narratives would be revised some four days later,21 
these dramatic initial reports roused the international community into action 22 
and U.S. forces began a formal investigation into the events and an effort to 
recover stolen items both within and outside of Iraq. As Middle Eastern 
media sources would point out, however, “numbers cannot tell the whole 
story.”23 The true number of looted pieces likely came to around 15,000; 
approximately only 4,000 of them having been recovered to date.24
In the months that followed the looting, many perspectives on the 
looting were offered in both the journalistic and academic realms. Accessing 
Iraqi perspectives on the looting of the museum has been difficult, with Iraq’s 
infrastructure in shambles and there being less opportunity for occupants of a 
war zone to voice their opinion than we enjoy in the Western world. Though 
the barrier of not speaking Arabic is also a factor, English translation of A1 
Jazeera coverage has provided some insight into how the Iraqi people viewed 
the looting. Many critics, Western and Middle Eastern alike, blamed the U.S. 
for not securing the museum as quickly as it had secured other civic 
ministries. Others spun the events as evidence to justify the U.S. invasion, 
with a variety of opinions also emerging in between. Amid these myriad 
viewpoints, a most common thread, however, emerged—lamentation for the
21 Joffe, p. 37
22 Hitchcock, p. 29
23 Priceless museum items go missing. (2003, September 11). A1 Jazeera.
24 Gerstenblith, p. 290
15
loss of these irreplaceable antiquities embodying thousands of years of world 
heritage.
Sadly, throughout history, it has not been unheard of for a nation to 
devalue the heritage of another that it conquers. The practice has dated back 
to the Roman era, and probably earlier.25 Throughout history, victor nations 
have pillaged the cultural property of those they conquered, and Iraq has been 
no stranger such “predetermined [policies] to destroy the physical memory of 
a vanquished enemy.”26 For a population to actively pillage remnants of its 
own cultural heritage amidst conflict, however, is a much more uncommon 
and exceedingly troubling act that merits examination. Given such a terrible 
loss suffered by a world heritage site in the twenty-first century, a subsequent 
search for explanation was inevitable.
The subject of looting has thus been examined from multiple 
angles, giving rise to a number of hypotheses concerning the motivations 
behind it and the meaning arising from it. Sifting through myriad 
perspectives, one finds that the focus of these hypotheses is most often to first 
identify motivating factor(s) behind the destruction and then to categorize the 
destruction that occurred in order to arrive at some semblance of 
understanding.
25 Gerstenblith, p. 249
26 Stone, Peter and Bajjaly, Joanne, eds. The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq.
Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press (2009), p. 7.
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Key Contributory Factors to Episodes of Widespread Looting
There is a wide array of theories on the motivation behind 
extensive looting. Readings of literature on the topic reveal a spectrum that 
spans from greed to need, but despite this diversity of opinion, sociologists 
often find four key components of episodes of looting. These components are 
potential looters, an availability of goods that are valued and stand to be 
looted, an absence of restraining factors, and a permissive socio-cultural 
environment.27 Notably, all four of these factors were abundantly present in 
the climate leading up to the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
It is difficult to conceive that any one of these four factors can give 
rise to episodes of widespread looting on their own; rather, all four must be 
simultaneously present to give rise to such a phenomenon. We can frame the 
four contributing factors to looting within a supply-demand model. This 
model would predict the supply of valuable items relative to the demand for 
them to steer the extent of the looting. The looters—whether random citizens 
from surrounding neighborhoods, professional thieves, or regime insiders— 
and the stolen goods from the museum comprise the “supply” portion of the 
events of April 2003. The demand factors in fostering the looting reside in the 
chronic underdevelopment of the nation and a lucrative black market for
27 MacGinty, Roger. “Looting in the Context of Violent Conflict: A Conceptualization and 
Typology.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004). pp. 861-864.
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antiquities. The overall “unstable and unregulated environment” in which this 
supply-demand interaction was able to occur speaks to the lack of restraining 
factors and socio-cultural environment generally permissive the plunder of 
cultural property from the national museum.28
Potential looters were abundant. In such violent conflicts, “most of 
those who can leave the country do.”29 A large number of Baghdad residents 
remained in their homes during the invasion, and among them were those 
whose economic desperation was and frustration with the Baathist regime was 
palpable.30 That is not to say, however, that all residents who remained were 
potential looters. Rather, as they were able to assess the conflict’s impact on 
their neighborhoods, there were groups among them who interpreted the 
relatively small invading force’s lack of intervention in the looting of other 
government buildings as proof that the “Americans were unable, or unwilling, 
to impose order”31 and as tacit permission to do engage in looting.32
Second, valuable goods were certainly vulnerable to looting within 
the museum compound in April 2003. Indeed, much of the city housed items 
that could be stolen once the invasion accelerated. While the majority of the
28 Vreeke, p. 3
29 Ferris, Elizabeth and Matthew Hall. “Update on Humanitarian Issues and Politics in Iraq.”
Brookings-Bem Project on Internal Displacement (2007), p. 2.
30 Gawron, Laura. “An Examination of the 2003 Looting of the Iraq National Museum: How
the Protection of Iraq’s Cultural Property Was Overlooked.” Seton Hall University 
(2010), pp. 52-57.
31 Gawron, Laura, p. 17.
32 Gerstenblith, p. 288
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population remained in their homes during the siege, elites fled in large 
numbers. Iraqi wealth was distributed unevenly, favoring the elites.33 As the 
Coalition forces and the Baathist regime struggled against one another, the 
vacant enclaves of the rich housed goods ready to be taken and redistributed 
among the masses.
Such pillaging required a conducive environment. The remaining 
third and fourth factors—the absence of restraining factors and a permissible 
socio-cultural climate—made this possible. These third and fourth factors 
were interlinked; the perceived absence of restraining forces likely comprised 
a main component of a larger climate permissible to looting.
The lack of constraints originated in the conflicting goals and 
power struggles of three authorities: the U.S.-led Coalition, the Baathist 
regime, and the museum staff. As the Coalition and Baathists fought one 
another, the remaining museum staff was unable to secure the help of either in 
securing the museum amid the conflict.
Economic depression and a thriving market for Mesopotamian 
antiquities made looting an attractive form of generating money for average 
Iraqis. The country’s education system did little to build ties between the 
populace and the remnants of the region’s Mesopotamian heritage. The
33 Schubert, Samuel. “Revisiting the Oil Curse: Are Oil Rich Nations Really Doomed to
Autocracy and Inequality?” Oil and Gas Business. National Defense Academy in Austria, 
Institute for Human and Social Studies (July 2006), p. 8.
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museum’s outward association with the outgoing oppressive regime prompted 
Iraqis to devalue the museum holdings. Together, these three factors created 
would “combine to create a very volatile situation in which it is perfectly 
understandable that large scale looting can happen at any time.”34
The primary economic basis for looting cannot be dismissed. The 
effect of poverty on cultural heritage can be devastating,35 and the situation in 
Iraq was no exception. Both the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage 
and its collections of artifacts certainly suffered “from the effects of economic 
hardships caused both by debts from the war with Iran and by comprehensive 
sanctions in response to the invasion of Kuwait.” The collection suffered as 
few resources safeguarded its longevity and security.
More tellingly, the general population felt the effects of 
unemployment, poverty, and hunger as a result of the international sanctions 
and isolation from the international community stemming from Saddam 
Hussein’s actions. On the eve of the 2003 invasion, poverty and jobless rates 
continued to inhibit economic and social progress. Throughout the 1990s, 
nearly two-thirds of Iraqis were dependent on government food rations, some 
twenty percent of the population lived under the UNICEF definition of
34 Stone and Bajjaly, p. 107
35 Gerstenblith, p. 350
36 Russell, John M. “Efforts to Protect Archaeological Sites and Monuments in Iraq, 2003-
2004.” Catastrophe: The Looting and Destruction of Iraq’s Past. Chicago: The Oriental 
Institute Museum (2008), p. 29.
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“extreme poverty,” more than one million children went malnourished, and 
sanitation suffered.37 This extreme poverty was not limited to Baghdad and 
other cities. Outside of the cities, many were unable to sell their crops and 
one of the few means of survival was providing the goods demanded by 
antiquities dealers.38 Antiquities were a ready, nearby, and easily liquidated 
asset. Under the same conditions in 1994, as former head of the State Board 
of Antiquities and Heritage Mu’ayyad Sa’id noted, “The priority [then was] 
how to feed the people.”39 In 2003, many citizen looters similarly responded 
to such dire conditions by looting the museum, as well as other institutions of 
cultural heritage and archaeological sites outside of Baghdad, hoping to sell 
artifacts to “obtain additional income due to chronic underdevelopment.”40
Encouraging these sales was a well-established black market in 
antiquities comprised of private collectors, tourists, art dealers, museums, and 
even terrorist organizations 41 Illicit trade in antiquities has met punishment 
with severity in Iraq since 1958, though it was revived after the First Gulf War 
in 1991.42 Prehistoric artifacts of the Mesopotamian past were known to fetch 
a particularly high price. For instance, some private collectors had been able
37 Harding, Scott. “The Sound of Silence: Social Work, the Academy, and Iraq.” Journal of
Sociology and Social Welfare. Vol. 31, No. 2. (2004), pp. 183-184, 186.
38 Stone, Peter. ‘The Identification and Protection of Cultural Heritage during the Iraq
Conflict: A Peculiarly English Tale.” Antiquity. Vol. 79 (2005), p. 938.
39 Joffe, p. 33
40 Vreeke, p. 4
41 Vreeke, pp. 5-8
42 Gawron, p. 46
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to purchase small artifacts that exist in greater number, such as stone cylinder 
seals that record ancient life’s religious beliefs, civic administration, and trade 
activities for $200—a sum not insignificant to an impoverished citizen of 
Baghdad—with the knowledge that they could in turn be sold for at least ten 
times that amount, while larger objects have been sold for prices upward in 
the millions of dollars.43 Arab-centric media sources have highlighted this 
“steal to order” system by which wealthy collectors exploit “penniless 
villagers.”44
Amid such dismal conditions, the opportunity to sell antiquities 
that were likely to fetch a lucrative price on this black market became an 
attractive means of either providing sustenance or augmenting an existing but 
inadequate income. This has been evidenced by investigators’ interviews with 
some of the perpetrators as museum pieces were recovered ultimately 
revealing the true motive to have often been selling the artifacts to private 
collectors, art dealers, or corrupt curators, and it has been argued by 
economists studying the chronic poverty and underdevelopment amid which 
these perpetrators lived.45 Many scholars have noted that this black market 
and the “destruction of [the] cultural infrastructure of Iraq” acted together in
43 Vreeke, p. 7
44 Stealing undiscovered history in Iraq. (2004, April 14). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.alj azeera.com/.
45 Vreeke, pp. 4, 6-8
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paving the way for much of the widespread looting of the museum 
• compound.46
Due to this economic dimension to the looting, Arabic media 
coverage rarely depicted the looting of the museum specifically. In fact, by 
2006 and 2007, timelines of the war’s key events published by 2006 did not 
mention looting at all,47 and neither did evaluations of Bush administration 
strategies to date.48 What coverage did mention the looting highlighted how it 
inhibited oil production and the receipt of foreign aid in Iraq,49 and how it was 
symbolic of the greater breakdown of order.50
Additionally, the national school curriculum of Baathist Iraq 
played a strong role in the population’s path to looting. Iraqi schools 
minimized connections between the populace and their Mesopotamian 
heritage as preserved in the museum’s collections. Prior to the 2003 invasion, 
Iraq had in place an established public education system, though disparities in 
education became apparent for many citizens after the age of fourteen. This
46 Hamilakis, Yannis. “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Military-Archaeology Complex: Iraq,
Ethics, and Neo-Colonialism.” Archaeologies: Journal of the World Archaeological 
Congress (14 February 2009), p. 10.
47 Timeline: Conflict in Iraq. (2006, March 20). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
48 Bush strategies in Iraq to date. (2007, January 11). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.alj azeera.com/.
49 World Bank struggles with Iraq finances. (2003, August 2). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http ://w ww. alj azeera.com/.
50 Iraq recovers lost artefacts [s7c]. (2010, September 21). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
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education was primarily Islamic in focus, with little inclusion of the nation’s 
prehistoric heritage. Only one year of the entire ten years of required public 
education devoted any time to Mesopotamian history, and this cursory glance 
occurred at age twelve. “This [was] the only opportunity that pupils [had] to 
study ancient Mesopotamian history,” and students were arguably too young 
to identify with long lists of unfamiliar names and events, so “most pupils 
forgot about it completely” after being “taught about it, just for one year.”51 
As a result, few Iraqis had any extensive knowledge or investment in their 
material heritage, and museum professionals have reaffirmed that these 
“looters did not know much about these ancient peoples.”52
It stands to reason that citizens with a sense of pride and ownership 
in a museum are more likely to protect it than they are to loot it, and 
successful cultural heritage preservation depends heavily on resonating with 
the population at large.53 Granted, being vested in heritage may not 
necessarily be enough to overcome designs for survival amid the poverty and 
oppression that prompted much of the looting. These factors are likely 
unequal, with survival seemingly outweighing appreciation for heritage under 
dire enough conditions. Nonetheless, increasingly widespread feelings of
51 Stone and Bajjaly, p. 106
52 Gawron, p. 53
53 Hitchcock, p. 37
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ownership in national heritage bode more favorably for cultural heritage 
protection than the alternative.
Furthermore, the museum as an institution had built irrevocable 
ties to the Baathist regime. Archaeology has long been “a powerful tool to 
bind the multiethnic Iraqis together, as some of the country’s early leaders 
were not slow to recognize,”54 including the Baathists, as their regime had 
made considerable effort to connect itself to the nation’s Babylonian heritage 
as a means of legitimizing its authority. Upon coming to power in Iraq, 
Saddam Hussein focused heavily on archaeology, specifically that from pre- 
Islamic periods of history to foster Arab unity and unify diverse elements in 
the region. Like many rulers, Saddam recognized that heritage could 
contribute to a nation’s identity and esteem, and he deployed it to legitimize 
his “modern government’s claims as heirs to an ancient past.”55 As I later 
discuss in more detail, this mainly entailed the rebuilding of archaeological 
sites and incorporating archaeological themes into public persona.56 In fact, 
the Baathist government’s slogan was “Yesterday Nebuchadnezzar, today
54 Giannuzzi, Timothy. Book review of Magnus T. Bemhardsson’s “Reclaiming a Plundered
Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modem Iraq.” The American Journal of 
Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 23, No. 2 (2006), p. 118.
55 Cuno, James. “Antiquity Belongs to the World: Archaeology Must Be Shielded From
Nationalistic Laws And Politics.” The Chronicle of Higher Education Review. Vol. 54, 
Issue 43 (2008), p. B9.
56 Bemhardsson, Magnus T. Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation
Building in Modem Iraq. University of Texas Press, 2006, pp. 215-216.
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Saddam Hussein.”57 The museum was a vital piece in this plan, and use of it 
for this purpose reached particularly visible heights under Saddam’s rule, with 
him outwardly employing regime loyalists at high levels within the museum 
and displaying himself prominently within its exhibits to solidify this link 
between his present rule and that of the past, presenting his reign as the 
culmination of these previous empires.58
Given the regime’s focus on Mesopotamian heritage in the 
museum, it is strange that the schools did not stress this heritage in their 
curriculum. Paradoxically, ignorance of this history was advantageous to 
Saddam. Since “the general public was not too familiar with the basic facts of 
that history, as it was with Islamic history, and the Mesopotamian stories were 
not enmeshed in popular culture,”59 Saddam was able to present the 
Mesopotamian narrative to the public as he wished through the museum and 
archaeological sites. Acting as the keepers of this historical narrative and the 
sole source of dispensing it resulted not in wonder and allure from the public, 
but instead propaganda, as evidence by the 2003 looting and destruction.
57 Cuno, p. B9
58 Bemhardsson, p. 216
59 Bemhardsson, p. 215
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Resulting Types of Extensive Looting
These four elements that contribute to episodes of widespread 
looting have been shown to interact and give rise to three distinct categories of 
looting. These three types of looting are economic, selective, and symbolic.
It can be argued that all looting is economic, selective, and symbolic; in other 
words, episodes of looting simultaneously assume these dimensions. By way 
of definition, the differences between looting’s dimensions are discussed 
below.
First, economic looting is the most basic type of looting. It 
involves the looting of objects that satisfy an absolute need, such as food, 
shelter, or clothing, as well as goods that can be sold in order to satisfy these 
more basic needs.60 The driving force behind this type of looting is the need 
for either the items themselves or for goods that can be purchased with funds 
gained by selling the stolen items. In this light, the phenomenon of economic 
looting can be seen more as a civic uprising or strategy of survival than mere 
pillaging, as a significant portion of the populace so direly lacks necessities 
that it feels compelled to seize them for itself.
By the outset of the invasion, Iraq’s population had endured years 
of poverty and privation. Leading up to the U.S.-led invasion, international 
sanctions enforced against Saddam Hussein since 1990 led to more than one-
60 MacGinty, pp. 866-868
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fifth of Iraqis in densely-populated regions being unable to meet basic needs 
over long periods of time, declining food self-sufficiency and endemic 
malnutrition, and the degradation of Iraq’s once-advanced healthcare delivery 
system.61 All the while, Iraq enjoyed abundant oil resources. In fact, in 2003, 
Iraq had 112 billion barrels of crude oil reserves—the world’s second largest 
endowment, totaling eleven percent of the global total—and averaged 
production of 10.5 million barrels per day.62 Less than five percent of this 
wealth, however, ever went to the Iraqi people; instead, it funded the military, 
palaces, and the Hussein family’s lifestyle, producing “a very high level of 
acute poverty and starvation” for the rest of the population in which the 
majority of “the Iraqi people live well below the World Bank definition of 
poverty.”63 When oil resources were meant to provide some relief via the Oil- 
for-Food program, this proved a “poor replacement for a functioning 
economy,” as the sanctions crippled Iraq’s oil refinery structure and made it 
impossible to fulfill its quota in exchange for other goods, with the receipts 
often being slow to arrive, defective, expired, or spoiled.64
61 Harding, Scott. “Man-made Disaster and Development: The Case of Iraq.” International
Social Work. Vol. 50, No. 3 (2007), p. 300.
62 Kumins, Lawrence C. “Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues.”
Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress (2004), p. 1.
63 Gawron, p. 52
64 Bahdi, Reem. “Iraq, Sanctions and Security: A Critique.” Duke Journal of Gender Law
and Policy. Vol. 9, No. 237 (2002), p. 246.
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This environment ultimately constituted “the perfect storm” for the 
looting of Iraqi antiquities.65 Looting took place to sell antiquities on the 
black market to either feed or augment incomes. Archaeologists with 
experience in Iraq have noted that “archaeology is a convenient means solve 
such problems for poor Iraqis and their families. Many peasants see fields of 
pottery that you can dig up when you’re broke ... To poor Iraqis, there isn’t 
much difference between working in a field and digging in a site—it’s all 
work, and work brings money.”66 In this context, we can understand looting 
as an act of desperation and self-preservation.
The black market comprised of private collectors, art dealers, 
museums, and even terrorists organizations was there to “take full advantage 
of people’s ignorance, hatred, and suffering.”67 Depending on their wealth, 
private collectors purchase either well-known artifacts for their own 
enjoyment or lesser known items either as simple souvenirs or for their resale
ZTQ
value. Art dealers purchase a significant amount of looted artifacts and sell 
them to museums; indeed, history has shown museums to “have always been 
involved in the purchase of stolen or looted art.”69 Following the invasion of
65 Russell, pp. 29-31
66 Gawron, p. 53
67 Rothfield, pp. 54-55
68 Vreeke, pp. 6,19
69 Vreeke, pp. 7-8, 21
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Iraq, a number of terrorist groups even also dealt in antiquities stolen from the
70museum to gain access to cash or weapons.
Despite the evidence of widespread economic motive, reports 
emerged that Iraqi citizens seized the artifacts for altruistic reasons; foreign 
journalists reported that Iraqis regularly expressed appreciation for the 
artifacts and a desire to safeguard them from harm. As antiquities cannot be 
properly displayed in the average Iraqi home, motives for theft are not likely 
aesthetic or curatorial. Hiding the artifacts from both the invading Coalition 
forces and defending Baathist forces, however, seemed a more likely 
possibility. Reports of looters’ intent having been to secure the objects until 
proper order could be restored were indeed more common. For instance, a 
nearby resident returned two high-profile items—one of the twin copper bulls 
from Ninhursag and a four-foot statue of the Assyrian King Shalmaneser III— 
that he claimed to have taken for safekeeping. Outside of Baghdad, ordinary 
citizens helped the Chief Librarian at Basra’s Central Library save some 
seventy percent of its collections before the institution was looted and 
burned.71 Though they may not comprise the lion’s share of looters, those 
citizens who looted with altruistic intent demonstrated recognition of the 
sacred value of cultural property. The act of removing the collection items 
was meaningful; it declared the artifacts and the heritage embodied in them to
70 Vreeke, p. 7
71 Hitchcock, p. 37
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be the property of the Iraqi people rather than of the belligerents or even of the 
museum itself.
Heroic as these actions may have been, such incidents do not 
represent the majority of thefts. As Colonel Bogdanos, the military official 
leading the United States’ end of the museum recovery effort, would observe, 
nearly everyone that they encountered claimed to have taken something for 
safekeeping, much like nearly every criminal a district attorney encounters 
claims to be innocent.72 That being said, Col. Bogdanos has a bias that could 
not be ignored. As a member of the U.S. armed forces and career criminal 
investigator, his outlook was presumably predisposed him to search for 
alternatives to American guilt. Further, the average Iraqi’s disconnection with 
the ancient Mesopotamian past commemorated by the museum would also 
preclude this sense of ownership of the cultural property to have been felt on a 
widespread scale. Without widespread education in the region’s 
Mesopotamian legacy, as previously discussed, there can be little hope for the 
appreciation of the heritage that the artifacts embody. The overall aim of the 
masses in looting, therefore, would appear to be fiscal gain to satisfy personal 
and family needs. These conflicting testimonies that resulted, however, likely 
exposed each party’s desire to discredit the others in the aftermath of the 
looting.
72 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 151
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Second, selective looting, however, is more discriminating than 
mere economic looting. While the economic motivation behind it remains the 
same, it differs in that it requires that looters pay particular attention to a 
targeted selection of materials.73 The choice of certain items over others 
merits attention to why such items were preferable.
Professional thieves in the first and third waves of looting engaged 
in selective or connoisseurial looting. These thefts targeted particularly 
renowned artifacts of notable value were targeted for removal from the 
museum. Thieves took only the most valuable items in an organized and 
selective manner, bypassing replicas and less valuable objects.74 Other pieces 
were taken from areas of the museum complex where only a few individuals 
had access; comparatively sophisticated tools may have been used in their 
removal.75 These particular groups of looters were smaller in number than the 
masses who committed the second wave of indiscriminate looting, and took a 
comparably smaller amount of artifacts. While the monetary worth of these 
prized artifacts certainly attracted this particular wave of looters, their sacred 
value did not. Such thievery offers some of the most apparent evidence of the 
intense opportunism at play in the 2003 looting of museum.
73 MacGinty, pp. 866-868
74 Bogdanos, Matthew. “The Casualties of War: The Truth about the Iraq Museum.”
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Symbolic looting, in contrast to economic and selective looting, 
has less of a fiscal motivation behind it. This type of looting has as its 
motivation the desire to possess items that embody an administration or 
regime.76 The end goal, then, is to destroy or re-appropriate the objects for the 
purpose of symbolizing a dramatic change in power, venting anger against the 
outgoing regime, or punishing its members by erasing their remnants from the 
collective memory.
The gaping void in security in Baghdad in April 2003 gave the 
populace the opportunity to engage in symbolic looting. The United States’ 
narrow focus on taking the city left a veritable gap in power in which the 
looting was able to take place. The U.S. military could certainly have acted as 
a restraining force; its vast numbers, sophisticated weaponry, and systematic 
method of securing other parts of the city attest to this. Many critics in both 
the heritage and policy arenas have noted that “in this age of scrupulously 
organized invasions, precision bombing, and military planners, there was no 
reason that the Iraq Museum could not have been protected”77 and that, given 
“the swift securing of the Oil Ministry, the claim that similar provision for the
76 MacGinty, pp. 866-868
77 Petersen, Kirsten E. “Cultural Apocalypse Now: The Loss of the Iraq Museum and a New
Proposal for the Wartime Protection of Museums.” Minnesota Journal of International 
Law. Vol. 16 (2007), p. 179.
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museum was beyond American capacity simply [was] not credible.” Such 
capabilities and advancements, however, proved hollow as U.S. authority 
solely focused on the singular primary goal of militarily taking and occupying 
the city of Baghdad and securing its other civic ministries. The Coalition’s 
“focus of attention” was on “battling a determined resistance and restoring 
security” instead of “stopping desecrations like ... looting.”79 To U.S. forces, 
the museum did not merit protection, thus proving that the war’s planners and 
implementers did not value the museum’s contents.
The Iraq National Museum lay directly across the street from an 
elite Special Republican Guard compound and was along the approach to the 
al-Ahrar Bridge crossing the Tigris, an avenue vital to military transportation. 
It was also remarkably close to a key intersection crucial to supporting combat 
in the urban area. As a result, there was indeed a U.S. unit in very close 
proximity to the museum, but this unit, by virtue of their location, had orders 
from senior officers to secure this intersection to ensure support during the 
ensuing combat. Commanders ordered this unit not to shift focus to guarding 
the museum because the primary objective of taking the city outweighed 
this.80 While this question was likely raised in planning the invasion, the 
point of disconnection between planners and troops on the ground has yet to
78 Sandholtz, Wayne. “The Iraqi National Museum and International Law: A Duty to
Protect.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 44 (2005), p. 237.
79 Stealing undiscovered history in Iraq. (2004, April 14). A1 Jazeera.
80 Bogdanos and Patrick, pp. 204-206
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be pinpointed. For this, high-ranking officials must assume more blame than 
ground troops who are obliged to obey orders from above. Tragically, since 
the preservation of cultural heritage was not included in the invasion’s 
primary goal, the museum suffered the consequences.
While much blame rests on U.S. shoulders, Baathist forces are not 
immune to culpability. The Baathist focus on repelling the invaders did not 
distract them from securing the museum in the midst of the destruction. In 
fact, quite the opposite took place. A group of Iraqi soldiers had essentially 
fortified the museum compound, though not for the purpose of defending its 
collections; rather, the intention was to take capitalize upon its advantage in 
attacking Coalition soldiers as “Iraqi troops began to use the museum, with its 
prime location in central Baghdad, as a stronghold” to fight the invasion of 
Coalition troops.81 The parapet above the Children’s Museum and other 
positions were advantageous for anti-Coalition snipers, and were employed 
for these respective ends. Arriving at the museum after the looting, U.S. 
Marines found Iraqi military uniforms, rocket-propelled and hand grenades, 
and rifles and other small arms scattered throughout the museum.82
In a direct violation of the Geneva Convention, the Baathists had
made the museum itself a weapon against the invading forces. Doing so
81 Willis, Lindsay. “Looting in Ancient Mesopotamia: A Legislative Scheme for the
Protection of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage.” Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law. Vol. 34 (2005), p. 225.
82 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 5
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attracted return fire and openly invited destruction upon the museum complex. 
This is evidenced by the numerous bullet holes in the compound walls, the 
large hole in the Assyrian gate leading to the Children’s Museum made by a 
U.S. tank round, and other damage to stone columns.83 As the invasion 
progressed and the likelihood of victory diminished rapidly, many of the 
Republican Guard abandoned their mission to save their own lives.
Aside from the invaders and defenders, the remaining museum 
staff had entirely independent goals. Their main focus was to protect the 
collections of the museum, as well as to safeguard themselves and their 
families. The remaining staff made many preparations for the invasion.
They intended to stay in the basement of the museum to defend the 
collections, and had stockpiled enough food and water to last them for two 
weeks.84 Dr. George also distributed weapons to his staff to fend off looters, 
and the museum staff padded large items to withstand the shock of bombing 
and moved some particularly valuable pieces to secret locations as the 
invasion loomed closer.85 Ultimately, however, the staff abandoned these 
plans to defend the museum when they saw heavily armed members 
Revolutionary Guard enter the compound in anticipation of a significant 
battle. They locked the museum and fled its grounds for safety on the east
83 George and Gibson, p. 20
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side of the Tigris River, intending to return in a few hours, but U.S. troops
R f \closed all the bridges and they would not be able to return for five days.
Despite these preparations, the escalating level of violence forced 
them to vacate when it became clear that the museum compound would 
become part of the battleground. Shortly after, the looting began. The staffs 
personal safety and that of their families took precedence over defending the 
museum collections. The subject matter expertise and passion of then- 
Director of the Iraq National Museum Dr. Donny George and his staff are 
laudable. While the preparations made by the staff to protect the artifacts 
ahead of the conflict are laudable, due to the collapsing security all around 
them, they were forced to withdraw their presence from the compound, 
regrettably leaving the museum defenseless.
Compounding the power vacuum, looters were also emboldened 
since the Iraq National Museum was so strongly linked to the Baathist regime. 
The connection between the museum and the Baathist administration was a 
notion that the U.S. administration regrettably did not expect, but one with 
which it would struggle greatly. Unfortunately, institutions of cultural 
heritage are often just as much targets as they are symbols.87 What U.S. war
86 George and Gibson, p. 20
87 Hitchcock, p. 33
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planners did not comprehend was how strongly “many Iraqis would equate 
museum looting with stealing from Saddam, and not from themselves.”88
Under Saddam’s reign, the museum progressed to become “an 
official agency of the Iraqi government.... synonymous with the Baath 
party” with Saddam himself effecting this outcome as “everyone who worked 
at the museum had served at the pleasure of Saddam Hussein.”89 Not only did 
he feature himself prominently within the museum’s exhibits, Saddam also 
outwardly employed regime loyalists at high levels within the museum. One 
particular senior museum official, Dr. Hana Abdul Khaliq, enjoyed senior 
Baath party membership and was the sister of #41 on the Coalition’s Top 55 
most wanted list.90 Also giving the appearance of corruption was the fact that 
another high-ranking official at the museum, Dr. Jaber Khaleel Ibrahim al- 
Tikriti (the Chairman of the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage), was 
later revealed to be a senior Baath party official, leaving a “cloud [hanging] 
over the museum.”91 To illustrate how the Iraqi people understood this, one 
need only recall how the U.S. Marines in charge of recovering and rebuilding 
the museum’s collections after the looting encountered a riot after allowing 
Jaber to aid in museum reconstruction efforts. It became apparent that “the 
average Iraqi harbored an enormous amount of anger against anyone who was
88 Gawron, p. 56
89 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 16
90 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 276
91 Lawler, p. 585
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(or was merely thought to be) connected to the Hussein regime,”92 and the 
Iraq National Museum was so entrenched in the Baathist regime that scores of 
Iraqis assembled to voice their bitter displeasure with signs reading “Jaber is a 
dictator!” and “Remove all Baath party members!”93
To provide deeper context, the regime had continually used the 
museum to “strengthen [its] sense of attachment to a glorious past.”94 From 
this connection, they thus sought to legitimize their brutal wielding of power, 
though the 2003 looting would later show that this legitimization attempt had 
failed. The logic was that if the Baathists were the inheritors of 
Mesopotamia’s magnificent legacy, then their wielding of power was 
somehow justified. More importantly, as is customary for totalitarian 
regimes, it was not to be questioned by the populace. In this sense, the Baath 
party was thus able to exploit artifacts and works of art—objects that would 
be praised for their rarity and beauty in any other setting—to do the work of 
propping up their brand of oppression.95
Saddam Hussein had long made plain his understanding that 
cultural heritage was a prop to political power, most notably when he began 
rebuilding the ancient cities of Babylon and Nineveh in 1983. The regime
92 Bogdanos (2005), pp. 500-501
93 Bogdanos and Patrick, pp. 166-167
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stamped the bricks in the reconstruction with “in the reign of the victorious 
Saddam Hussein, the President of the Republic, may God keep him, the 
guardian of the great Iraq and the renovator of its renaissance and the builder 
of its great civilization,” just as the original bricks were stamped with the 
name of Nebuchadnezzar II in 605 BCE.96
Indeed, Baathist use of the museum reached particularly visible 
heights under Saddam Hussein. While all history is politicized, this was 
particularly true under Saddam’s rule. The most obvious indication of this 
was the prominent placement of portraits of Saddam in the museum’s grand 
rotunda, far too high to have been either taken or defaced by the masses 
during the looting.97 Placing Saddam’s likeness in the context of the galleries 
that displayed these ancient treasures associated him with the reigns of 
Hammurabi, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar and Saladin, declaring him to be 
their “modern day” counterpart.98 Further, his likeness’ elevated position 
relative to the artifacts implied Saddam’s ownership of them and his 
importance over them. In addition to the upper echelon of the staff serving 
according to his personal pleasure, Saddam “raided the holdings over and 
over,” so much so that U.S. efforts to assess the damages were slowed by the
96 Hitchcock, p. 33
97 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 125
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level of pre-invasion disarray directly attributed to Saddam." To academic 
purists, Iraq’s “pre-Islamic Mesopotamian past” thus served the role of 
“reflecting glory on his present-day secular tyranny.”100
Since the museum and its collections had come to represent the 
Baathist regime, the long-denied masses acted to re-appropriate the artifacts 
for their own purposes. The looting of cultural heritage symbolically 
“removed vestiges of Iraq’s p a s t... indicating that a new reality was in place,” 
as the “recent experience and memory of a repressive and ruthless government 
... necessitated a clean break from the past.”101 Looting was indeed a means 
to this end. By destroying items that symbolized regime strength, citizens 
erased this power. By stealing and selling such items for their own benefit, 
citizens lay a new claim to them and effectively reverse the previous power 
relationship. In this context, this act was a significant gesture.
There was a prevailing cultural sentiment among the Iraqi people 
that stealing was permissible, as long as it was from the government. This is 
because the Iraqi nation had long been taught “that its wealth was or the Arab 
Nation first, second for those who governed and their families, then the 
military, and then last were the people;” thus, the people’s “awareness that 
[they] came last in the minds of the governing elite led to an understanding
99 Bogdanos and Patrick, pp. 139, 138
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that it was acceptable for [them] to steal from government properties.”102 In 
Iraq, ordinary citizens “[were not taught] that government was supposed to 
administer and protect the wealth of the people on their behalf,” so the citizens 
of Baghdad understood that what was in the museum “was the property of the 
government, just as were the contents of any other government office or 
building,” and considered it “completely reasonable to take this property, just 
as people were taking—looting—from other government institutions and 
offices.”103 In the words of Dr. George himself, “Most of [the looters] were 
not educated, and to them the museum was just one more government 
building.”104 This does not reflect well upon the museum staffs efforts to 
educate the Iraqi populace of its Mesopotamian heritage; rather, it indicates 
them having played a more effective role in propping up the Baathist regime.
The implication of this sanctioned theft was that the property being 
stolen belonged to the Baathist regime, not to the citizens. The museum 
compound had thus become the site of a widespread expression of anger and 
frustration with years under Baathist rule. In this sense, the Baathist regime 
had not only alienated throngs of Iraqis from their own past, but also 
prevented them from having a stake in the nation and its heritage. This 
reveals the looting of its collections to be much more than simple pilfering;
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rather, it is more like an act of “wholesale iconoclasm.”105 “The masses 
sought to destroy something near and dear to Saddam’s heart.”106 The act of 
looting gave the lower classes a rare outlet of expression of emotions such as 
anger, hatred, or frustration with years of economic and social repression 
under Baathist rule, as they destroyed the museum’s administrative areas and 
ransacked its galleries and collections.
Stakeholders with Competing Self-Interests and the Devaluing of Cultural 
Heritage
In the events of April 2003, four stakeholders—the invading 
forces, Baathists, U.S. officials, and citizen looters—appropriated the museum 
and its collections in order to further their own competing interests and de­
prioritized cultural heritage in the process.
The decisions made by key U.S. war planners exposed their 
institutional belief that cultural heritage mattered far less than other civic and 
physical assets. While agents of the U.S. claim to have had a concerted plan 
to protect the museum, it was regrettably plagued and rendered ineffective by
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“misunderstandings, mistakes, surprises, and bureau infighting.”107 Put 
simply, any lack of clarity manifested cultural heritage’s low priority.
U.S. complicity in the looting was apparent; those observers 
tempted to blame the U.S. for the destruction have well-founded claims, given 
that the U.S. failed to prevent the looting in the first place or to stop it once it 
had commenced, despite having the resources to do so. A1 Jazeera noted how 
“looting and lawlessness swept Baghdad and other parts of the country after 
the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, often as U.S. forces stood by.”108 
Failure to protect the museum also reinforced the Iraqi people’s belief that the 
U.S. only cared for its own culture,109 that its concern for Iraqi heritage was 
disingenuous,110 and that it was completely unaware of the cultural differences 
that exist between the U.S. and Iraq.111 For Iraqis, the U.S. enabling the 
looting suggested that the key U.S. motivator in the invasion was vanquishing 
an enemy, as opposed to liberating a people, as official U.S. doctrine had 
declared.
107 Lawler, p. 582
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By securing other civic institutions—such as the Ministry of Oil 
and some of Saddam’s palaces112—before securing the museum, U.S. officials 
reveal their indifference to the museum. The low priority they assigned to 
protecting the museum in comparison with that they assigned to securing 
healthcare and energy resources, among others, reveals its secondary status. 
“When marines entered the city ... cultural property became a secondary 
concern” as the U.S. “ultimately deemed protecting the cultural heritage of the 
Iraqi people of lesser importance than dismantling the remnant of the Baathist 
regime, securing Saddam Hussein’s palaces and the Oil Ministry, and making 
the city safe for American soldiers.”113 This exposes the U.S. ignorance or 
dismissal of cultural heritage preservation’s and collective memory’s roles in 
society.
Second, in contrast, the Baathist government’s attention to cultural 
property reveals the belief that cultural heritage is indeed of importance, but 
not above being bent and reformed by their own agenda in the ensuing 
struggle for security. As with the United States, it is also unfair to accuse the 
Baathist government of not valuing cultural heritage. After all, this was a 
regime that invested great effort in linking themselves to an expansive lineage 
of Mesopotamian leadership. For many archaeologists, “Saddam Hussein
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developed a reputation as a faithful steward of Iraq’s cultural heritage.”114 As 
one Harvard scholar noted, “He [believed] he [belonged] to a history going 
back to ancient times .... so destroying it [did] not fit in with his self- 
image.”115
Prior to the First Gulf War, the Baathist government in Iraq 
“managed its cultural heritage resources, particularly its archaeological 
heritage, very successfully.”116 During his reign, Saddam Hussein encouraged 
archaeology in Iraq, refused partage (the practice by which foreign 
universities retained a portion of their findings to take home with them), and 
even sought to recover items removed under earlier regimes, claiming that 
these prior rulers did not “grasp the importance of these antiquities,” which he 
called “the treasures which are the symbol of the first and greatest civilization 
in human history.”117 All of this changed with the Baathist invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and the resulting war, sanctions, poverty, and isolation that
1 10
would follow. The museum remained closed for much of the 1990s, as well 
as after the 2003 looting,119 making the “non-profit museum almost never
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open to the public .... Saddam’s private treasure house” for more than twenty 
years.120
The Baathists subjugated the sacredness, educational value, and 
pride of their antiquities to their own claim to power. Such actions 
“[imposed] nationalist characteristics on antiquity” and “[distorted] the truth 
of culture.”121 The institution dedicated to their preservation was profanely 
used as a fortress to fight the invading Coalition forces, which endangered the 
artifacts and underscored their subservience to Baathist political imperatives. 
The invasion thus provided literal evidence of what the regime had 
figuratively done over the years. The economic and cultural dissatisfaction 
that motivated the looting of the museum and other historic sites outside of 
Baghdad attested to the Baathist administration’s long-term failure to 
prioritize cultural heritage preservation.
By contrast, the Iraq National Museum staff acted as if cultural 
heritage was paramount. Dr. George and his staff placed the educational 
value of artifacts at the forefront, and made considerable effort to protect them 
for this potential in a post-war Iraq. By taking measures to protect the 
antiquities, they had done one better than the U.S. and Iraqi forces. The 
museum staff had moved many of the public galleries’ prized artifacts to a
120 Bogdanos and Patrick, pp. 139, 228
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secret secure location ahead of time, and padded the items that were too large 
to move. Dr. George provided weapons to his remaining staff to protect 
themselves and the museum, and had stockpiled enough rations to stay at the 
compound to defend it until the city was secured and proper order could be 
restored.
The museum staff only abandoned the artifacts to preserve their 
own lives. After seeing Republican Guard members scaling the wall and 
making preparations for a battle at the site, “realizing the level of violence that 
was imminent,” Dr. George and the final remaining staff members locked the 
compound and fled.122 While they failed to protect the artifacts, their 
dedication to this collection seems unimpeachable.
The citizen looters believed in the value of artifacts, but largely for 
their economic potential. After all, groups of people simply do not loot 
worthless items. Alienated from guardians of heritage, most Iraqi citizens that 
chose to loot the museum of its contents upheld the monetary potential of the 
artifacts as primary. As discussed previously, the opportunity to sell 
antiquities that are likely to fetch a lucrative price on the black market likely 
became an attractive means of either sustenance or income augmentation to a 
portion of the population “well aware of their low rank on the economic
122 Bogdanos and Patrick, pp. 203-204
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scale” and where archaeology was considered “a convenient means to solve 
such problems for poor Iraqis and their families.”123
It must not be ignored, however, that these stakeholder narratives 
all aimed at self-preservation in a climate of intense competing interests. As 
the invading force, the U.S. placed other civic ministries at the forefront to 
justify its claim as a liberator, but suffered an embarrassing mishap when the 
museum was looted. At this point, foreign stakeholders appropriated the 
museum to preserve themselves. While Pentagon and White House officials 
were privately angered and embarrassed by the disaster, they publicly 
downplayed it, and opponents of the war used the incident as an opportunity 
to denounce the invasion while supporters of the war used it as an opportunity 
to justify the war effort.124 Indeed, many voiced their opposition to or support 
for the war in the narrative of preserving human history.
Within Iraq, the Baathist regime chose to shore up its claim to 
power prior to and during the war. Doing so left the museum in a regrettable 
state of pre-invasion disarray, as both funds and manpower became diverted 
elsewhere, and literally placed the institution in harm’s way during the 
conflict. As further disaster loomed, the remaining museum staff became 
ordinary private citizens and their primary goal then became securing their
123 Gawron, p. 53
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own lives and protecting their families. Ensuring the protection of antiquity 
and keeping it above the fray was understandably relegated as secondary to 
this more pressing aim.
The citizen looters also placed self-preservation at the forefront, 
with the exception of the few who may have taken items to safeguard them 
from destruction. This included both the ordinary citizens of Baghdad and the 
professional thieves. In contrast to the museum officials, they valued either 
seizing economic opportunity as their first priority or displaying frustration 
against the outgoing regime. “Angry citizens destroyed what they saw as 
government property in an act of protest, desperate opportunists stole what 
they could in an impoverished time, and calculating thieves seized a chance to 
steal some of the world’s most valued treasures.”125
What is apparent in examining these different approaches was how 
such dire times of intense competing self-interest can lead to the widespread 
looting of cultural heritage, as it did for the Iraq National Museum. 
Additionally, the deleterious effect such a climate can ultimately have on not 
only museums, but the ancient heritage that their collections preserve and 
embody also becomes evident.
125 Gawron, p. 60
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II. The Debates Arising from the 2003 Looting of the Iraq National 
Museum and the Inadequacy of Modern Cultural Heritage Protection
Laws
This second section will examine discussion that arose in the aftermath 
of the looting o f the Iraq National Museum in 2003. It will concentrate on the 
first o f two major strands o f debate—whether U.S. failure to protect the 
museum constituted a violation o f international law. This examination will 
underscore several conundrums facing heritage protection and preservation, 
illustrating how questions concerning potential U.S. violations o f 
international law reveal the inadequacies o f modern legislation in protecting 
cultural heritage.
Debate arising within the International Community
The actions of nations often serve as catalysts, spawning debates 
over the meaning of those actions, and the looting of the Iraq National 
Museum in 2003 has proved no exception. “State actions routinely trigger 
transnational arguments about the meaning and application of international 
norms,” and in the case of the 2003 looting of the Iraq National Museum, the 
“the U.S. failure to secure the Iraq National Museum clearly catalyzed a
1 0C\transnational argument about the obligation to protect cultural treasures.”
Within this dialogue, a number of important questions arose. 
Whether the United States had “an obligation to protect the greatest cultural 
assets of the Iraqi people” and whether American policy “[provided] adequate
126 Sandholtz, Wayne. ‘The Iraqi National Museum and International Law: A Duty to 
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51
guidance to ensure that the cultural property of the Iraqi people [would] be 
preserved,”127 among other issues, were at the forefront of the discussion. A 
consensus emerged that “cultural property is entitled to protection as a matter 
of international human rights.”128 Despite this developing level of accord, 
however, important political, moral, and legal questions still remained.
Amid the myriad perspectives offered in answer to these remaining 
questions, two recurring themes in turn emerge. One is the debate over 
whether the United States violated international law in failing to protect the 
museum from looting ahead of time or to come to its aid when the looting 
began. The other, examined in the next section, is whether approaches rooted 
in cultural nationalism or internationalism are most appropriate in long-term 
efforts to help to restore the museum.
The Evolution of International Law Protecting Cultural Property
A generous amount of international law addresses the protection of 
cultural property during wartime. These international conventions may be 
referenced, interpreted, and applied to United States’ actions in relation to the 
Iraq National Museum in 2003. Prior to World War II and the widespread
127 Thurlow, Matthew D. “Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military
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plundering of cultural property that came with it, some tenets existed. The 
Lieber Code of 1863, for instance, forbade the pillaging or destruction of 
public or private property during armed conflict, while the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited among its parties willful damage to
129historic monuments and works of art and science.
Following World War I, the Roerich Pact of 1935 emerged in 
response to the destruction of religious and educational institutions in France 
and Belgium. The pact was a Pan-American agreement for the protection of 
cultural property among the United States and twenty other countries in the 
Western Hemisphere. While the Roerich Pact mirrored the Hague Convention 
of 1907 in many ways, it afforded broader protections to historic, artistic, 
scientific, and educational sites during conflict, giving them neutral status and 
declaring that parties to the agreement had an obligation to “respect and 
protect” such sites.130 Any specificity in what these tenets forbid, however, is 
not reflected in the notion of penalties for infractions; rather, they stipulate 
that violations “should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”131
Just as the cultural devastation of World War I led to the Roerich 
Pact, the affronts to cultural property experienced during World War II led to 
the Hague Convention of 1954. This convention stipulated that nations take
129 Sandholtz, pp. 206-209
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measures to protect their own cultural sites in the event of war, invoking the 
notion of a shared cultural heritage of all mankind. This tenet prohibited 
invaders from attacking such sites and defenders from using them in ways that 
attracted damage, as well as included the notion of individuals being held 
accountable for violations under these tenets and subject to legal proceedings. 
Parties to the convention were also charged with preventing damage to 
cultural property by its own forces or the local citizens.132 The Hague 
Convention would ultimately become the foremost piece of international law 
in protecting cultural property and, not surprisingly, the main tenet referenced 
in critiquing the United States’ actions in relation to the Iraq National 
Museum.
At the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations had not ratified the 1954 Hague Convention. 
This decision was made not to immediately ratify it in order to preserve the 
possibility for nuclear action against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In the years since, most notably in 1972, with reduced nuclear threat, more 
precise weaponry, and desire to prosecute crimes against cultural property, the 
Department of Defense and Department of State reconsidered and 
recommended ratification, though ratification did not occur until 2008.
Despite this inaction, the U.S. had not “objected to the provisions of the 1954
132 Sandholtz, pp. 209-215
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Hague Convention,” and it had “repeatedly affirmed that [its] armed forces 
comply with the treaty’s requirements both in military policy and in 
practice.”133
From this evolution of international conventions, one can observe a 
progression in international norms to increasingly reaffirm and expand 
protection for cultural property and relics of heritage—one onto which the 
U.S. eventually formally signed. This “clear trend in international law has 
been to reaffirm and expand protections for cultural property” in the “common 
interest of international society in preserving historical, architectural, and 
artistic treasures.”134 These provisions have provided for “protection from 
intentional attack, incidental damage, pillage, and theft by state actors and 
military forces of states who are parties to [them].”135
Notably, the 1954 Hague Convention and the Roerich Pact 
represent the culmination of this progression in the protection of cultural 
property. “The Roerich Pact read together with the Hague Convention seem 
to present a united front of States, encompassing the entire globe ... [sharing] 
a common burden of protecting their own and other States’ cultural property 
to ensure the common benefit of posterity’s enjoyment and understanding of
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great works of history.”136 Not surprisingly, these international tenets mark 
the main standard against which U.S. actions in Iraq have been judged, and 
are widely referenced in the ensuing discussion over whether U.S. inaction 
regarding protecting the museum amounted to a violation of international law.
The Debate over Whether the U.S. Violated International Law
Within this discussion, heritage professionals, government 
officials, museum authorities, legal scholars, and others argued whether the 
U.S. violated international law by failing to protect the museum from looting. 
Both sides of this particular debate enjoy a considerable degree of 
representation within this body of literature. Although opinions varied, more 
discussants argued that the U.S. did indeed violate international law. This 
reading of literature in this arena shows that the belief that the U.S. violated 
international law is often been based on an interpretation of the intent behind 
such tenets and the spirit of national unification with international norms, 
while the belief that the U.S. did not violate international law, on the other 
hand, is most often been based on a strict and literal reading of the laws in 
question.
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Arguments supporting the Belief that the U.S. Violated International Law
Many legal scholars deem the U.S. failure to protect the museum 
to indeed amount to a violation of international law. This belief, more often 
than not, has been supported with readings of the intent behind the relevant 
tenets and the spirit of national harmony with international standards. Several 
lines of thought appear in the body of literature supporting this. Based on a 
high-level reading of standards of international law such as the Hague 
Conventions and the Roerich Pact, support encompasses responsibilities 
incurred as the occupier of a country and has equated crimes against culture 
with crimes against humanity.
Given the trend in international norms to progressively reaffirm 
and expand protection for cultural property, scholarly literature and 
jurisprudence has been unsurprisingly critical of U.S. actions. Indeed, 
“international reactions ranged from critical to scathing” and “reactions within 
American society were just as vehement,”137 according to Dr. Wayne 
Sandholtz, a Professor of Political Science whose work focuses on 
international norms and institutions. Other authorities, such as the Muslim 
Association of Britain, likened the Coalition occupation of Iraq to the Mongol
137 Sandholtz, pp. 190, 194
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invasion of 1258 in terms of “cultural and historical vandalism.”138 A high- 
level reading of the Roerich Pact and the Hague Convention, along with other 
related international tenets, reveal their purpose to indisputably be the 
safeguarding of relics of cultural heritage during periods of violent strife. 
Given this high-level reading and public officials’ orders to conduct 
themselves in accordance with such standards, despite not formally being a 
party to all of them at the time of the invasion, the U.S. may have implicitly
1 ^ 9recognized a reasonable expectation of protection for the museum. As 
many have noted, “though the United States is not a party to the Hague 
Convention for Protection of Cultural Property, it is a signatory and is thus at 
least nominally tied to both treaties.”140 Thus, the U.S. plausibly was under 
international obligation to provide some degree of security to the museum.
In a similar vein, the literature argues that the looting was 
avoidable. Chief among both journalists’ and scholars’ accusations were that 
U.S. war planners should have been able to anticipate the looting of the 
museum given past experiences in the First Gulf War and explicit warnings of 
the likelihood of looting by Middle East scholars and heritage preservation 
experts prior to and during the war. The “disparities between official 
reassurances and the realities on the ground” that legendary British
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archaeologist and soldier Mortimer Wheeler saw in both World Wars I and II 
were tragically still being made in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.141 U.S. 
authorities failed to heed these explicit warnings, appearing simply to not pay 
attention. The “United States’ accountability will” then “be dependent on 
whether or not its failure to prevent the organized and sustained looting of the 
museum can be considered destruction or ‘willful damage’.”142
The key lesson learned from the museum’s looting in 2003 is that 
negligence is often conflated with purposeful destruction. For many, if the 
looting was a foreseeable outcome, then U.S. inaction was the same as 
action.143 Whether it was an error of omission or commission, however, the 
two often amount to the same thing for those that suffer as a result. Though it 
is more likely true that U.S. officials were reluctant, rather than incapable, to 
foresee the pillaging, it mattered little. Even if the necessary information had 
not made it to the decision makers, there is no difference in culpability. 
Ultimately, U.S. officials’ inability or unwillingness to anticipate the looting, 
their slowness to stop the looting when the second widespread wave of theft 
had begun, and its sluggishness in securing the museum compound once the
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looting had ceased are themselves akin to actually participating in the theft 
themselves.
Going beyond the minimal responsibility, then, has revealed itself 
to be necessary in ensuring the protection of cultural heritage during times of 
strife. Contrasting U.S. action relative to the “the swift securing of the Oil 
Ministry” 144 in Baghdad and the nation’s oil fields outside of it is a useful 
illustration. Though this was arguably unnecessary under minimal 
responsibilities, doing so had the potential to help secure Iraq’s economy in 
the future, so the U.S. exceeded minimal responsibilities and secured these 
resources. The same could easily have been achieved for the museum, and 
failing to anticipate or recognize a duty to do so betrays a unilateral or 
isolationist mindset.
Additionally, the U.S. incurred responsibilities as an occupier in 
Iraq. The 1907 Hague Convention affirmed that “territory [was] considered 
occupied when it [was] actually placed under the authority of the hostile 
army” and the occupation extends .... where such authority has been 
established and can be exercised.”145 According to this, there was a strong 
argument that the U.S. was essentially an occupying power in Iraq “with
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competencies and responsibilities under the laws of war.”146 A study just two 
months prior to the invasion by the U.S. Army War College reaffirmed this, 
stating that “occupiers assume responsibility for historic and cultural sites.”147 
The United States, therefore, had responsibilities to protect the museum. As 
such, national officials, such as high-level commanders, were potentially 
responsible for the 2003 looting. Low-level leaders, such as “a sergeant or a 
company commander on a combat mission in an Iraqi town, while hostilities 
are generally ongoing in that sector, cannot not easily shift from a combat role 
to the role of police officer .... But those much higher up in the chain of 
command, who see the larger picture and who can assign various missions to 
soldiers, have a responsibility to deploy troops to engage in law and order 
roles in sectors that come under control of U.S. military forces to the extent 
that such areas generally come under effective U.S. control and occupation
1 A O
law and order competencies can be exercised.”
A third line of thought supporting U.S. culpability rests on the 
sentiment that crimes against culture are analogous to crimes against 
humanity.149 The study of material culture depends entirely on items 
embodying a deeper set of meaning for individuals or groups. In the case of
146 Paust, p. 1
147 Stevens, Lt. Erin A. ‘The Cultural Sword: Leveraging Cultural Property in Iraq.”
University of Military Intelligence, Fort Huachuca, AZ. (2008), p. 2.
148 Paust, p. 4
149 Stealing undiscovered history in Iraq. (2004, April 14). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http:// w w w. alj azeera. com/.
61
cultural property, it “carries significance far beyond the value of the object 
and appeals to a sector of the world’s population far beyond any individual 
owner.”150 Later in 2003, the Iraqi Special Tribunal that was put in place to 
govern criminalized “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health.”151 It follows, then, that crimes against cultural heritage could 
potentially be viewed as grievous as crimes against humanity.
If cultural treasures could be viewed as infrastructure connecting 
diverse people with a shared heritage, then the act of “analogizing cultural 
treasures to physical infrastructure is quite instructive. The historic and 
artistic treasures of a country are its cultural infrastructure. They are palpable 
pieces of its heritage, traditions, and identity, connecting its people one to 
another.”152 If the United States’ aim was to liberate a nation and stamp out a 
history of crimes against humanity, it would, by the same token, be bound to 
eradicate crimes against cultural property and the remnants of cultural heritage 
as well.
Bolstering this jurisprudential belief that the U.S. violated 
international law is the opinion of the Iraqi people. The narrative of who is to
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blame persists throughout the coverage of much of A1 Jazeera’s coverage, 
with US idleness or negligence being the predominate culprit. For instance, 
coverage claimed that the small size of the U.S. force near the museum and
the tank round shot into it was their way of inviting the looting to exact
1revenge on the Baathists. *
Arguments against a U.S. Violation of International Law
Despite the depth and strength of this case, some legal scholars 
argued that U.S. actions did not amount to a violation of international law. 
These contentions rested on a literal reading of international conventions and 
the obligations under them.
There was a litany of justifications that officials cited as reasons 
the U.S. had no obligation to secure or protect the museum. Chief among 
them was the conviction that the U.S. presence in Iraq was not an occupation, 
but rather a liberation, as evidenced by it having never been proclaimed to be 
an occupation, as well as the fact that conflict was ongoing. These 
justifications, however, were only tenuously defended. Ultimately, wrote 
Jordan Paust, who is among the most cited of American law professors and 
has served on a number of committees regarding international law, human
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http://www.aljazeera.com/.
63
rights, laws of war, terrorism, and the use of force, “regardless of the purpose 
of the overall mission, the lack of formal admission, and the fact that some 
fighting [was] still taking place, the United States [was] an occupying power 
with competencies and responsibilities under the laws of war ... in each 
portion of Iraqi territory that [fell] within effective control of its military.”154
Other defenders of U.S. policy argued that combating the civilian
looting was a secondary concern to militarily controlling the Baathist
stronghold of Baghdad, as well as that U.S. officials did not foresee that Iraqis
would loot their own heritage in the first place.155 The latter seems unlikely,
given that weeks before the invasion commenced, the Archaeological Institute
of America published an “Open Declaration on Cultural Heritage at Risk in
Iraq” that was signed by thirteen organizations and more than two hundred
individuals around the world; the president of the American Association of
Museum Art Directors published an opinion-editorial piece in the Washington
Post on the matter; and the president of the American Council for Cultural
Property expressed concerns in writing to prominent war planners, including
1the Defense Secretary, National Security Advisor, and Secretary of State.
Put simply, “if the goal of the United States in invading Iraq was actually to
154 Paust, p. 1
155 Sandholtz; p. 197
156 Sandholtz pp. 197-198
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bring democracy and freedom, protecting cultural institutions would have 
been a meaningful show of goodwill.”157
Additionally, domestic U.S. antiquity laws—such as the Cultural 
Property Act and the National Stolen Property Act—prohibited and prevented 
the illicit import, export, or transfer of cultural property, and thus offered little 
assistance to prevent looting.158 For instance, there remained some debate as 
to whether the U.S. was formally bound by the 1954 Hague Convention. As 
previously discussed, the U.S. had not signed the convention and was thus not 
a party to the 1954 Hague Convention at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Given, however, that the U.S. did claimed to “follow its principles as a 
matter of customary international law,” it does seem appropriate for one to 
“consider the United States ... as bound by the provisions of the 1954 
Convention,” 159 but a literal reading of the law would not necessarily ensure 
this.
Aside from literal readings claiming that international conventions 
were inapplicable, others argued that the U.S. adhered to relevant laws. Some 
pointed out that there still remained some confusion as to what U.S. forces
157 Petersen, Kirsten E. “Cultural Apocalypse Now: The Loss of the Iraq Museum and a New
Proposal for the Wartime Protection of Museums.” Minnesota Journal of International 
Law. Vol. 16 (2007), p. 191.
158 Smith, William C. “Law versus Looters.” American Bar Association Journal. Vol. 89
(2003), p. 20.
159 Gerstenblith, Patty. “From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of
Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century.” Georgetown Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 299, 305.
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were specifically charged to do, even if the United States was indeed bound 
by the 1954 Hague Convention. Second, U.S. defenders claimed that 
invading forces closely adhered to legal obligations during conflict by not 
actively engaging in the looting, nor causing willful damage to sites of historic 
significance, and avoiding risky appropriation of such sites without military 
necessity.160 To this end, the Iraq National Museum, along with numerous 
other museums and archaeological sites were added to the no-strike list and
1 /r i
escaped direct damage from the Coalition bombardment.
Additionally, the convention only required the prevention of state- 
sponsored looting, not civilian looting as was seen in Iraq in 2003. While few 
are unconvinced of the responsibility to maintain public order and safety, 
there were some who questioned “whether preventing this type of looting is a 
tenet of maintaining public order.”162 The wording of the convention also 
only required occupying forces to assist the national authorities in
1safeguarding artifacts, not to actually assume this responsibility themselves. 
These claims ignore that, under some conditions, this may be near impossible 
for national authorities to accomplish, or the possibility that there might be no 
national authorities left in place to do so.
160 Jackson, pp. 48, 50-51
161 Detwiler, Elizabeth. “Iraq’s Cultural Heritage: Preserving the Past for the Sake of the
Future.” United States Institute of Peace. October Briefing (2008), p. 1.
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The Inadequacies of Legislation in Protecting Cultural Heritage
Overall, the productiveness of this debate was limited. The events 
had already occurred and the majority of recoverable artifacts had been 
reclaimed. No formal charges against the U.S. have yet been levied, nor are 
there likely to be. More debate will not likely return more artifacts or repair 
the museum. This debate has effectively highlighted shortcomings in 
international conventions that address these situations.
To protect remnants of cultural heritage and property, international 
law on its own is patently inadequate as a means of deterrence. Such 
conventions are ultimately ineffectual without being backed by a legitimate 
national conviction to fulfill their intended purpose. Generally, significant 
loopholes in relevant international tenets include clarity of responsibility, 
being a party to the conventions, reliance upon burdened nations, the notion of 
military necessity, and being unclear in focus. These holes can, and did in the 
case of the museum, amount to a failure in international protections for 
protecting museums during wartime.164
For instance, one gap in international conventions concerns clarity 
of the responsibilities that ensue after an initial invasion. Obligations in 
stability operations remained less apparent. While the “requirement to assist 
‘competent national authorities’ in ‘safeguarding and preserving [their]
164 Petersen, pp. 179-187
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cultural property’ during periods of occupation” may be “relatively well 
settled,” questions remain, such as not only “what is the extent of assistance to 
‘competent national authorities’ that is required by international law?” but 
also “when does ‘occupation’ begin?”165 In the case of the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, “there is still considerable controversy to this day about when U.S. 
forces established effective control over the area of Baghdad near the 
museum, which would trigger the protection of an occupying force.” 
Additionally, even if “the legal obligations of cultural property protection in 
armed conflict have been scrupulously adhered to, the legal obligations to
1 A7provide such protection in stability operations have been less clear,” thus 
opening the door for a failure to occur.
Another large loophole in international law governing cultural 
heritage protection concerns parties to the international conventions and the 
responsibilities that ensue. Unfortunately, “the line between national and
1 A Sindividual responsibility for the destruction of cultural property is tenuous.” 
When individuals commit such offenses, there is no guarantee that his or her 
nation will pursue prosecution. When nations commit such offenses, by the 
same token, the global community lacks an undisputed “formal and consistent
165 Jackson, p. 48
166 Jackson, p. 51
167 Jackson, p. 56
168 Thurlow, p. 183
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prosecutorial or adjudicative body” capable of leading the way in terms of 
enforcement.
This lack of clarity regarding responsibility extends to nations as 
well. There are significant points of failure in international conventions such 
as the 1954 Hague Convention and the Roerich Pact relating to the 
safeguarding of cultural property. There are gaps concerning exactly when 
these tenets are applicable, what must be done under them, and what the 
penalties are for failure to comply with them. “The international conventions 
designed to protect cultural property fall short of mandating protection for all 
possible situations.”169 The contestation over whether the U.S. was bound by 
these tenets is evidence enough of this deficiency, and the same is true of the 
contestation over what the U.S. was bound to do under these conventions and 
who, if anyone, may be formally held accountable. The question then arises, 
what to do when nations are not formally bound by the conventions and tenets 
in place governing cultural property?
Indeed, the current “standards of cultural property protection 
remain vague and open to multiple and competing understandings and invite 
parties to re-construe treaty obligations in ways that are politically or
169 Paroff, Sasha P. “Another Victim of the War in Iraq: The Looting of the National 
Museum in Baghdad and the Inadequacies of International Protection of Cultural 
Property.” Emory Law Journal. Vol. 53 (2004), p. 2053.
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militarily expedient.”170 Given this inadequacy, cultural tragedies of large 
proportion such as the 2003 looting of the Iraq National Museum are bound to 
occur. The 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols “can have little efficacy 
when it is not accepted by many countries throughout the world.”171 That the 
U.S. had not ratified it at the time of the Iraq invasion, and did not until 2008, 
reveals the tenet’s limited effectiveness. While not having ratified it for so 
long indicates a unilateral spirit out of touch with the international 
community, it does not make it any less difficult to make nations culpable for 
violating treaties to which they are not formally a party.
Additionally, the convention “relies too much on the countries 
involved to protect their own cultural property.”172 In order to accomplish 
this, nations must prioritize other preparations over artifacts ahead of conflict 
and leave less-equipped agents to fill in, while the international legal 
community often “offers little effective assistance.”173 This can amount to an 
undue burden for many nations when preparing to face widespread armed 
conflict. In 2003, Iraq was charged with protecting its own artifacts leading 
up to the conflict. As noted previously, the remaining museum staff did a 
remarkable job making what preparations they could—removing some items 
for safekeeping elsewhere, securing larger immovable items to better weather
170 Thurlow, p. 182
171 Petersen, p. 179
172 Petersen, p. 179
173 Petersen, pp. 184-185
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the Coalition bombing campaign, as well as arming and supplying themselves 
to protect the museum complex for a sustained period of time. They were, 
however, very quickly forced to flee the conflict and there was no formal Iraqi 
government left to protect the museum complex once the looting began.174 
The confluence of non-existent Iraqi forces and unwilling U.S. agents 
ultimately paved the way for the tragic looting of thousands of years of 
cultural heritage to occur.
The notion of “military necessity” also creates a dangerous hole in 
international conventions concerning the safeguarding of cultural heritage. 
Military necessity, in this context, allows forces to waive their obligations to 
refrain from actively exposing culturally significant sites when necessary. It 
holds that damage to culturally significant sites is excused when the warring 
parties had no other choice. Such an “exception for protection of cultural 
artifacts,” however, “further weakens the protections granted by the 
convention,” and many describe it as a “convenient fiction.”175 As is often the 
case, the definition of what exactly constitutes military necessity was unclear. 
Legislation often grants discretionary power and creates an out for warring 
parties when it is “militarily inconvenient” to provide protection or convenient 
to destroy. An exception for military necessity effectively advertises the
174 Petersen, pp. 180, 183
175 Petersen, pp. 179, 181-183
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secondary status of cultural heritage protection to a nation’s military conquest 
in times of armed conflict.
Additionally, an imprudent focus can also be perceived in 
international conventions. Notably, there has been a “shift in international 
law from conceptualizations of cultural property as private property or the 
property of a nation-state to property of the international community and
1 7 A‘individual peoples’.” The Geneva Protocols and the Hague Convention, 
for instance, re-conceptualize cultural property as belonging to certain 
peoples, as opposed to nations or the world, because “national interests are 
divergent” and thus cannot be trusted to consistently protect the cultural 
property of all subgroups.177 Taking this into account, U.S. policy did not 
succeed, at least partially, because it afforded protections to cultural property 
that were barely more stringent than those afforded regular private property.178 
Implicit in this malfunction is the failure to recognize that cultural property 
has vast importance over that of customary private property. This distinction 
between regular private property and cultural property cannot be overstated; 
the intrinsic higher value ascribed to cultural property underlies the entire 
international protocol for its protection during times of conflict.
176 Thurlow, p. 156
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The tendency of international tenets having a reactive rather than a 
proactive focus is also problematic. There are still “limitations on the 
international community’s ability to prevent and prosecute acts against 
cultural property in times of war.”179 Tenets such as the 1954 Hague 
Convention and later UNESCO conventions “focus too heavily on repatriation 
and the recovery of items” having cultural significance that are looted or 
damaged in armed conflict, when “the focus should be on the prevention of 
looting” in the first place.180
While it is laudable that such conventions require an occupying 
force to prevent the export of artifacts abroad and to return all artifacts found 
when the conflict ends, unfortunately, the damage has most often already been 
done during this process. Focusing on repatriation ignores “the number of 
artifacts that will be destroyed in the actual looting, let alone the destruction of 
the museum building and its fixtures.”181 Furthermore, there are no 
guarantees that these looted artifacts may ever be found in recovery efforts. 
“When professional art thieves with great knowledge of the black market are 
involved,” as was the case with two of the three waves of looting in 2003 Iraq, 
“there is even less chance that pieces will be recovered.”182 Indeed, many
179 Paroff, p. 2041
180 Petersen, pp. 179-180
181 Petersen, p. 187
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museums that have been looted are still missing pieces decades after 
repatriation efforts began, and the Iraq National Museum no exception.
The Necessity of Firm National Support in Cultural Heritage Protection
Apart from underscoring the delicate balance within which cultural 
heritage protection exists, an international discussion is less important than 
resolution, whether the context is meaningful laws or meaningful 
enforcement. If the U.S. did not violate international law, then the 
effectiveness of heritage protection laws is significantly diminished. If the 
U.S. violated these laws, then these tenets have failed on the grounds of 
enforceability. Surely some governing body can enforce these rules during 
wartime, but the failure for this to have occurred in the wake of the 2003 
looting of the Iraq National Museum speaks to a deficiency of enforcement. 
What we have learned in the wake of the looting is that protective laws are 
useful, though they must accompany legitimate national commitment in order 
to succeed.
The argument that U.S. actions did not violate international law 
demonstrates the limitations of international conventions and tenets alone. 
After all, recent operations in Iraq have “demonstrated the failure of the legal
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mechanisms in ensuring such protection”183 and shown how “international 
safeguards for cultural property have been ineffective in protecting 
museums.”184 As the 2003 looting of the Iraq National Museum illustrates, 
“international attempts to protect cultural property have not immunized 
museums from looting and destruction. Just as the lives of an invaded people 
remain at risk during international conflict, so too are the artistic creations and 
archaeological remnants of those people likely to become the victims of that 
conflict.”185
International law is not enough to ensure protection of cultural 
property. Legal mechanisms offer insufficient protection for humanitarian 
concerns, including the preservation and protection of relics of cultural 
heritage. That cultural heritage continues to suffer during armed conflict, 
even as relevant conventions, pacts, and treaties have been in place for some 
time, provides evidence for this. That is not to say that international law 
governing the protection of remnants of cultural heritage should be ignored or 
abolished; rather, it highlights the bitter reality at play that “the law is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to protect humanitarian concerns in armed 
conflict.”186
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Put simply, international conventions aimed at preserving cultural 
heritage can do little until nations actually wish to do so. International 
conventions like the Hague Conventions of 1899, 1907, and 1954, as well as 
the 1977 Geneva Protocol I are indeed honorable examples of legislation. The 
“provisions of the conventions should not bear all of the blame,” but rather, 
“nations must share the blame for nonparticipation and noncompliance.”187 
“International laws, in whatever form and with whatever provisions, will only 
be effective in protecting the cultural property of the world when the great 
nations of the world decide that such property is worth protecting and act 
upon that decision.”188 Only then will the necessary lasting commitments in 
the form of both fiscal and human resources result.
This would mark a significant change of direction for the United 
States. It would represent an alignment of U.S. norms with those of the 
international community. One way to accomplish this would be to exceed 
treaty obligations, which would be especially useful, given the “vagueness and 
ineffectiveness of international cultural property treaties.”189 One of the most 
apparent means of observing this is the “sharp distinction between 
intentionally looting and destroying sites of cultural significance and the far
187 Paroff, p. 2053
188 Paroff, p. 2054
189 Thurlow, p. 182
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broader duty to protect cultural property.”190 While U.S. actions may have 
fulfilled the former responsibility, they certainly fell short of the latter. The 
sentiment expressed by those advocating for a minimal fulfillment of 
responsibility that “the United States could have done much more to protect 
the museum” but, regrettably, “did all that was required under international 
laws of war”191 must not be forgotten as this evolution of national doctrine 
occurs. Cultural heritage protection should then be a “key focal point in 
stability operations and counter-insurgency ... even if such protection is not 
required as a matter of law.”192
Such a spirit of fulfilling minimal obligations has contributes 
significantly to the notion of American callousness that hampers the nation’s 
international reputation and its progress in nation building abroad. From the 
events of April 2003, the United States learned that “intentionally destroying 
cultural sites is often conflated with negligently failing to prevent their 
destruction” and that in “real terms, it does not matter who destroys cultural 
property, it only matters that it is lost.”193 While a minimalist commitment to 
compliance may “[prevent] some destruction of cultural property,” it “[fails] 
to speak to the larger values behind these rules.”194 If the international tenets
190 Thurlow, p. 179
191 Paroff, p. 2023
192 Jackson, p. 47
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in place cannot fully ensure the fulfillment of this broader duty to protect, then 
exceeding these minimal responsibilities is the surest path forward. The U.S. 
must then, in the future, move beyond traditional obligations and pursue more 
active measures that “represent larger international and national ideals” in 
order to prevent the plunder of the remnants of cultural heritage.195
The United States has already made progress in this endeavor since 
the terrible events of 2003. One need only compare the nation’s initial 
invasion strategy to its more recent counter-insurgency strategy. U.S. policy 
makers and war planners began by spending most of their time and energy on 
the least demanding task—defeating Saddam’s weakened conventional 
forces—and the least amount on the most demanding—rehabilitation of and 
security for the new Iraq.” Hindsight has indeed shown that aside from the 
initial justification for the war proving false, “the most glaring error was the 
failure to plan for stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.”196
Since 2003, however, armed forces have incorporated principles of 
cultural heritage protection into their counter-insurgency manuals. After all, 
“if the center of gravity of the counter-insurgency (COIN) fight is the people, 
then their cultural heritage is the conscience of the people ... and a visible
195 Thurlow, p. 184
196 Jackson, p. 51
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symbol of their society.”197 Now the U.S. COIN Manual emphasizes cultural 
awareness, training for soldiers in this arena, as “respect for cultural norms 
and objects has ... become an integral part of both counterinsurgency and 
stability operations.”198 While this was not the case in 2003, it has been noted 
that “stability operations can only be successfully accomplished with 
integrated civilian and military efforts.”199 The museum is an integral part of 
this, as this essay will subsequently discuss in greater detail.
Another path forward is to revise a more modern national policy 
regarding cultural property. At the time of the looting of the Iraq Museum, 
the official U.S. policy was in harmony with international conventions nearly 
one hundred years old. Such reliance upon outdated conventions not only 
leads to tragedies such as the 2003 looting, but it also “fails to recognize 
evolving understandings of culture and cultural ownership.”200
Additionally, “the world’s only superpower [remaining] a non- 
party to [the 1954 Hague Convention]” despite “the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals and the assessments of international law scholars 
[converging] on the conclusion that the key norms embodied in the [treaty] ... 
have achieved customary international law status”201 was notable. While the
197 Jackson, p. 47
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U.S. had not formally objected to or criticized any of the treaty’s provisions, it 
nonetheless had not signed it. This underscored years of the U.S. having been 
unaligned with the international community.
The U.S. Senate ratified the 1954 Hague Convention in 2008, 
which partially aligned the nation with the international community. This 
outcome was undoubtedly influenced by the 2003 looting and the international 
community’s subsequent condemnation. Ratifying the 1954 Hague 
Convention was meaningful in that it not only clarifies, but also reinforces the 
responsibility assumed by the U.S. to protect cultural property during periods 
of armed conflict.
Realigning its policies with widely accepted international norms, 
however, is not enough. As many practitioners and scholars of international 
law have noted, the mere “ratification of international treaties will not be 
enough to save the world’s cultural property from destruction.”202 Rather, the 
United States must go one step further, adhering to both the word and the 
broader intent of these conventions and working to reform these tenets in 
order to continually become more substantive and effective as time 
progresses. The United States’ doctrine relating to cultural property during 
wartime will certainly continue to evolve. Cultural property laws must be 
“explicit, rather than implicitly derived” from a series of other general
202 Thurlow, p. 185
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provisions, but too little progress has yet been made to this end.203 As 
“doctrine assigning responsibility for protection of cultural property in 
stability operations is still evolving,”204 the United States must play a leading 
role in this evolution to ensure its success. Only then might tragedies such as 
the looting cease.
U.S. officials must not assume that the nation has little interest in 
complying with international norms. Indeed, the opposite is true. “If the 
United States offends international sentiment by neglecting to respect national 
cultural property, it can expect an adverse impact on its diplomacy and global 
perception generally.”205 Military victors “are already sufficiently reviled by 
those whom they have conquered without aiding—whether through action or 
inaction—the destruction of a conquered country’s culture.” Protecting 
cultural heritage, then, can be a gesture of goodwill that may lend an air of 
legitimacy to such interventions.
If the United States’ “concern for cultural property is exclusively 
reserved for that of the Americas, then its concern runs counter to the purpose 
o f ’ international tenets.207 It also runs counter to U.S. national ideals. “The 
United States’ interest in the preservation of international cultural property
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should be strengthened in recognition of American diversity and the 
possibility, therefore, that many Americans may be tied to cultural property 
located outside the Americas.”208 In this light, aligning the nation’s norms 
with the standards of the international community is indeed simultaneously in 
the best interests of the United States.
208 Campbell, p. 431
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III. Nationalism or Internationalism? The Conundrum Facing Cultural
Heritage Protection Today
The previous section examined discussion that arose in the aftermath 
of the 2003 looting o f the Iraq National Museum, with a focus on one o f two 
main strands o f debate—whether the U.S. violated international law by failing 
to prevent or halt the looting. This section will focus on the second strand of 
debate—whether a theory o f cultural nationalism or internationalism is most 
appropriate in repairing the museum.
This section weighs the merits o f museum reconstruction strategies 
rooted in both cultural nationalism or and internationalism. It will examine 
the pros and cons o f each alternative and show that, despite each school o f 
thought enjoying a considerable degree o f support, the prevailing trend in 
modern years has been to lean toward more international approaches. It will 
also demonstrate how debate over the merits o f culturally national or 
international reconstruction strategies reveal a bitter tradeoff between acting 
in the best interest o f the global community or that o f the recovering Iraqi 
nation.
The Second Strand of Debate within the International Community
As previously discussed, the 2003 looting of the Iraq National 
Museum generated considerable debate. From the dialogue emerged a 
consensus upholding the importance of protecting cultural heritage in times of 
strife or conflict. Still, important political, legal, and moral questions 
remained. Two recurring themes emerged: the first concerns whether the 
United States violated international law in failing to afford protection to the 
museum complex. The second addressed whether cultural nationalist or
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internationalist approaches more appropriately should shape efforts to help to 
restore the museum.
Cultural Nationalism vs. Cultural Internationalism
Two principal schools of thought relating to material culture and 
preservation are cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism. Today the 
Iraq National Museum is open, though far from fully functional. Only about 
half of its galleries are accessible to the public.209 A number of well-known 
items have been recovered and others continue to be returned, such as a statue 
of the Sumerian King Entemena recovered in 2010.210 All but 254 of the 
2,703 estimated to have been taken from the first and second floors have been 
recovered.211 A renovation of the Islamic and Assyrian halls was completed 
with a donation and technical and assistance from Italy, though the strength of 
the museum’s security remains to be determined.212 Some former members of 
the staff disappeared after the war,213 but those that remain continues its
209 Lack of funds hinders Iraqi museum. (2010, September 25). AlJazeera. Retrieved from
http:// www. alj azeera. com/.
210 Iraq recovers lost artefacts [sic]. (2010, September 21). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
211 Priceless museum items go missing. (2003, September 11). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.alj azeera.com/.
212 Iraq reopens looted national museum. (2009, February 24). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://w w w. alj azeera.com/.
213 Priceless museum items go missing. (2003, September 11). AlJazeera.
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0 \ Amission, though a lack of funding hinders its efforts to preserve artifacts 
and improper cataloguing may persist.215 While these gains have been 
encouraging, much progress remains, and further plans are not concrete.
Amid this, there is “heated debate over how Iraq’s heritage should be 
managed.”216
By way of classification, cultural nationalism tends to 
“[emphasize] the national origin of the cultural objects, with the goal of 
retaining all objects in their home country.”217 This gives nations “a special 
interest, implies the attribution of national characters to objects, independently 
of their location or ownership, and legitimizes national export controls and 
demands for the ‘repatriation’ of cultural property.”218 Implicit in cultural 
nationalism is the belief that source nations must be able to control the 
historical narratives that artifact aid in communicating, and some groups may 
choose to place value on the reworking, recycling, or omission of such 
narratives.219 One basic justification is the ease of policing buyers of
214 Lack of funds hinders Iraqi museum. (2010, September 25). AlJazeera.
215 Iraq reopens looted national museum. (2009, February 24). A1 Jazeera.
216 Lewis, Erin. “Gertrude Bell and Archaeology in Iraq: From World War I to the ‘War on
Terror’.” The Post Hole. Issue 9 (2012), p. 19.
217 Willis, Lindsay E. “Looting in Ancient Mesopotamia: A Legislation Scheme for the
Protection of Iraq's Cultural Heritage.” Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law. Vol. 34 (2005), p. 229.
218 Merryman, John Henry. “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property.” American
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antiquities than protecting all objects of cultural value.220 More fundamental
motivations behind cultural nationalism stem from the belief that there “is an
2 2 1offense” to the country of origin if the objects reside in any other country. 
Retaining such objects, in this view, supports the cultural growth and 
understanding of the source nation’s people and lures both sustained research
and tourism to the source nation. On both the educational and economic
222levels, a “nation stays alive when its culture stays alive.”" Keeping objects 
in their source country enables that country to thrive commercially and 
culturally.
Cultural internationalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the 
common culture of mankind over the particular experience of any source 
nation alone.223 Not surprisingly, such views undergird arguments against 
adopting culturally nationalistic legislation. The theory of cultural 
internationalism focuses on the proposition that “‘cultural property belonging 
to any people whatsoever’ is ‘the cultural heritage of all mankind’” and, under 
this, “everyone has an interest in the preservation and enjoyment of all 
cultural property, wherever it is situated, from whatever cultural or geographic
220 Willis, p. 231
221 Merryman, John Henry. ‘Thinking about the Elgin Marbles.” Michigan Law Review.
Vol. 83 (1984), p. 55.
222 Stone, Peter. ‘The Identification and Protection of Cultural Heritage during the Iraq
Conflict: A Peculiarly English Tale." Antiquity -  Oxford. Vol. 79, No.306 (2005), p. 
943.
223 Willis, p. 232
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source.”224 The interest in protecting and preserving the objects are, therefore, 
placed above the interest of the nation of origin in retaining the object. The 
key players that promulgate such views are wealthier, often Western, nations 
and those who oppose the political element of cultural nationalism, feeling 
that uncontrolled nationalism “may distract from the cultural and historical 
importance of the objects.”225
Preservation of artifacts is a major concern for cultural 
internationalism. The theory aims to balance “the integrity of artifacts, or the 
need to have all pieces of particular artifacts together, to enhance their 
cultural, aesthetic, and educational values” with the bitter reality that often, 
“source nations do not have the resources to fully preserve the objects for 
future study and exhibition.” Additionally, “an appropriate international 
distribution” of artifacts “of the common cultural heritage” can avoid 
“destructive retention,” “covetous neglect,” or the hoarding of artifacts in 
source nations that lack the proper resources,227 while simultaneously 
facilitating the world’s cultures to both be exposed to and understand their 
own artistic, scientific, and civic achievements, as well as those of others, as
224 Merryman “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles,” p. 57
225 Willis, p. 231
226 Willis, p. 232
227 Merryman “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,” pp. 83-84
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“all of mankind has a reasonable opportunity for access to its own and other 
people’s cultural achievements.”228
Each approach has strengths and limits. Cultural nationalism can 
often be best for the source country. This is largely due to realizing the 
economic benefit of tourism economics, fostering a national identity, 
providing a beneficial social education for citizenry, and preserving a 
sustainable future of domestic scholarship. Cultural internationalism, on the 
other hand, frequently safeguards the artifacts themselves and heritage 
preservation as a field of study. Internationalism often serves the artifacts 
when source nations are relatively poor and when the global community can 
enjoy more widespread access to the artifacts, thus fostering a broad sense of 
common heritage.
Cultural Nationalism or Internationalism in Recovery Strategies for the 
Iraq National Museum
Whether strategies based in cultural nationalism and cultural 
internationalism are more appropriate for recovery efforts for the Iraq 
National Museum has been frequently debated. There have been a number of 
heritage professionals who support each option, as well as some who advocate
228 Willis, p. 233
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for a mix of the two. Recently, debate has favored cultural internationalism. 
Not surprisingly, in keeping with the current trend, the literature on the Iraq 
museum to date overwhelmingly supports cultural internationalism.
Arguments supporting Cultural Nationalism in the Museumfs Recovery
The main avenue of support for strategies rooted in cultural 
nationalism for the recovery of the Iraq National Museum is the belief that 
autonomous nations should be able to do as they wish with the remnants of 
their own cultural heritage. From a Rawlsian ethics approach, few countries 
would want to sacrifice such control. Additionally, with regard to the 
recovering Iraqi nation, the ability to retain its cultural property could “instill 
a notion of common heritage in the Iraqi people,” as well as “greatly uplift the 
spirits of the Iraqi people and aid them in forming a greater sense of national 
unity.”229 In fact, a letter to the President of the United States from all major 
American archaeological and heritage organizations hinted at this, noting that 
the “return to freedom of the Iraqi people must include the freedom to enjoy 
the great heritage resources inherited from their ancestors.”
From this degree of control of one’s own cultural heritage stems 
the belief that culturally nationalistic legislative schemes can foster a
229 Willis, pp. 249, 246
230 Hamilakis, p. 106
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connection with this past and thus a greater degree of unity in the present. 
Since cultural nationalism “encourages a national interest in the history and 
culture of the nation and, therefore, increases a people’s pride in their nation,” 
many believe that pursuing a recovery strategy rooted in cultural nationalism 
for the Iraq National Museum would benefit the Iraqi populace during this 
“state of upheaval and new beginnings.”231
An additional strain of underlying logic is that “retaining the 
nation’s cultural objects ... supports the cultural growth and understanding of 
the nation’s people” due to “the value inherent in the possession of the 
antiquities” to “lure archaeologists, scientists, and historians in the nation and 
from abroad.”232 There is also financial benefit that may be realized from the 
development of cultural heritage tourism in source nations that merits 
mention.233 Cultural tourism has been an incredibly lucrative industry in a 
number of countries—e.g., Egypt, Italy, France, and Greece—with their 
economies benefiting from a “constant flow of tourists flocking to see ... 
historical achievements in monuments, ancient ruins, and museums.”234 This
231 Willis, p. 243
232 Willis, p. 230
233 Stone, p. 941
234 Stevens, Lt. Erin A. “The Cultural Sword: Leveraging Cultural Property in Iraq.”
University of Military Intelligence, Fort Huachuca, AZ. (2008), p. 4.
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positive economic impact has also been recognized by Britain’s Department 
for International Development.235
Looking to history, this surely can be witnessed in the case of Iraq. 
For years, Iraq’s sense of national identity has indeed been shaped by its 
cultural heritage. This trajectory can be traced back to British archaeologist 
Gertrude Bell, the wealthy Englishwoman who developed an appreciation for 
Mesopotamian while studying at Oxford and traveled extensively through the 
Middle East, surveying a number of the region’s archaeological sites. Bell 
served in a number of British offices in the region both during and after World 
War I, was instrumental in establishing the pro-British Faisal monarchy, and 
eventually established what would become the Iraq National Museum.236 The 
“sense of Iraqi nationalism that had guided [Bell’s] politics transferred into 
her archaeological work,” as her legacy began with an interest in archaeology 
but ultimately “became the achievement of unity for a people who live in 
separate factions.”237 Although she may not have been “the instigator of 
nationalist ideas in the country, for they were already emerging before WWII, 
[Bell] gave the people of Iraq control over their antiquities and therefore 
control over their past,” which “gave the Iraqis a sense of national identity,
235 Stone, p. 941
236 Werr, Lamia Al-Gailani. “A Museum Is Bom.” The Looting of the Iraq Museum,
Baghdad: The Lost Legacy of Ancient Mesopotamia. Harry N. Abrams (2005), pp. 27- 
28.
237 Erin Lewis, pp. 17, 19
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embodied in the museum she set up,” which proved to be “an essential 
component for [the] new country to be successful.”238
Prior to the war with the United States, Iraq’s previous legislation 
was also nationalistic in nature. The Antiquities Law of 1936, for example, 
declared all antiquities—defined as “movable and immovable possessions 
which were erected, made, produced, sculptured, written, drawn or 
photographed by man, if they are two hundred years old or more”—to be state 
property, prohibited their removal or damage by citizens, charged citizens 
with reporting such violations, and forbade excavation without state 
approval.239
Contemporary observers believe that adopting this previous 
legislation would encourage a greater popular interest in Iraqi history and 
culture. Aside from the substantial economic benefit from future cultural 
heritage tourism in the future, communicating the importance of this common 
heritage could lead to a larger measure of unity within the new Iraq, with the 
artifacts themselves helping to unite Iraqis.
238 Fagan, Brian M. Return to Babylon: Travelers, Archaeologists, and Monuments in
Mesopotamia. University Press of Colorado (2007), p. 276.
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Arguments supporting the Museum’s Recovery via Cultural 
Internationalism
The main avenue of support for strategies rooted in cultural 
nationalism for the recovery of the Iraq National Museum is the belief in a 
shared global history that must be preserved for future generations. Since it 
“could be argued th a t... Iraq’s heritage is essential to the common history of 
humankind,” many believe that “Iraq could gain the support of many peoples 
by exposing them to Iraq’s artifacts and history” and that the nation would 
thus “benefit greatly from the distribution of its artifacts, as [this] would allow 
other cultures and nations the opportunity to study and appreciate the Iraqi 
cultural heritage.”240
“Cultural heritage is important... Not for any specific nationalistic 
agenda but for the explicit agenda of making the world a better, safer, more 
harmonious, and more civilised [sic] place to live.”241 As a result, the belief 
that the remnants of a cultural heritage must be shielded from nationalistic 
agendas that distort the narrative of history is more than common. Nationalist 
approaches are common in nations “newly formed as the result of the 
dissolution of empires.”242 Since modern-day Iraq would certainly be
240 Willis, p. 246
241 Stone, p. 943
242 Cuno, James. “Antiquity Belongs to the World.” Chronicle of Higher Education. Vol. 54,
No. 43 (2008), p. B8.
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classified as.one such nation, it is thus imperative to be aware of the peril that 
nationalism can pose to cultural heritage.
According to a number of scholars of cultural heritage, the 
culturally nationalistic stance is a political instrument. “Politics bedevils 
archaeology, and has for more than a century,” and the “sad truth is that 
nationalist cultural-property laws are not intended to protect the world’s 
ancient heritage,” but instead “are meant to claim that heritage as the property 
of the modem nation-state, important to its identity and esteem.”243 If 
nationalistic cultural property laws do not protect the heritage, but rather claim 
it as a country’s property to “legitimize modern governments’ claims as heirs 
to an ancient past,” it is imperative to note that this “[distorts] the truth of 
culture,” by “[imposing] nationalist characteristics on antiquity when none 
could possible exist,” making it appear that culture is static and pure when, in 
reality, it is “fluid and mongrel.”244
While it may be argued that nationalistic agendas may have made 
the Iraq National Museum one of the most valuable in the world, the perils of 
cultural nationalism can be seen today. Iraq’s new government has since 
reassigned the Iraq National Museum from being housed under the 
nonpolitical State Board of Antiquities and Heritage to now be located not
243 Cuno, p. B9
244 Cuno, p. B9
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within the Ministry of Culture, but rather within the Ministry of Tourism and 
Antiquities under the control of the radical cleric Moqtada A1 Sadr,245 the 
same cleric who issued the ominous message that while Muslim heritage 
should be respected, looting of pre-Muslim relics was permissible.246 Such a 
political maneuver poses grave danger to the long-term safety of cultural 
heritage. Radical sectarian groups influencing the populace to be “only 
interested in Islamic sites and not Iraq’s earlier heritage” has already led to the 
physical destruction of eighteen heritage sites within Iraq, most notably at 
Kirkuk and Kifel.247 Worries about what could happen to the museum are, 
therefore, not unfounded. A group of international archaeologists noted this 
and urged the new Iraqi government to put its cultural heritage under the 
Ministry of Culture, as “only a strong, national, nonpolitical State Board of 
Antiquities and Heritage, backed fully by the force of the State, can preserve 
the heritage that is left.”248
Past evidence supports the benefit of cultural internationalism for 
cultural heritage protection in Iraq. “In the past most archaeological digs in 
Iraq have had foreign sponsorship—the Germans at Babylon and Uruk, the 
British at Ur and Nimrud, the French at Kish and Lagash, the Italians at Hatra,
245 Cuno, p. B8
246 Jenkins, Simon. “In Iraq's Four-year Looting Frenzy, the Allies Have Become the
Vandals.” The Guardian. Vol. 6, No. 8 (2007), p. 2.
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and the Americans at Nippur.”249 This background has paved the way for 
many scholars to advocate for such a strategy of international assistance in the 
museum’s recovery.
Many see this responsibility as being in the public interest. 
Preserving a communal worldwide history then follows this model of 
balancing “the inescapable tensions between current uses and future needs and 
between private interests and mutual interests.”250 For many, there is “no 
better illustration of the world-wide recognition of the legacy obligation to 
future generations than the international reaction to the looting of Iraq’s 
National Museum of Antiquities during the spring of 2003.”251 After all, 
public management is a field that surely encompasses a state’s cultural 
heritage professionals. The responsibilities of an effective public manager 
speak to his or her “responsibility to future generations,” which entails 
“ensuring a viable future by preserving resources and ensuring the capacity to 
... preserve and transmit civilization’s cultural, intellectual, artistic, and 
historical legacy.”252
249 Bogdanos, Matthew. “Fighting for Iraq’s Culture.” New York Times. (March 6, 2007).
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The Regrettable Conundrum Facing Cultural Heritage Protection and 
Preservation in the Iraq National Museum Recovery
This debate between strategies rooted in cultural nationalism or 
internationalism in the recovery of the Iraq National Museum reveals a 
tradeoff that frequently escapes recognition, let alone discussion, with regard 
to the museum. Specifically, this tradeoff lies, on the one hand, between the 
best interests of the artifacts themselves along with long-term efforts to 
cultivate and foster a global sense of cultural heritage; on the other hand lays 
the best interests of the Iraqi nation as it recovers from the last decade of 
warfare and the last twenty years of international sanctions. This author 
favors a hybrid approach by which some artifacts would remain in-country to 
serve the Iraqi people while national turmoil persists and others would be able 
to travel abroad to safeguard them from physical harm and foster international 
solidarity with the recovering nation.
Across the globe, the recent trends have favored cultural 
internationalism. The recovery of the Iraq National Museum is no exception. 
With regard to the artifacts themselves, the physical remnants of cultural 
heritage often enjoy increased protection and an improved degree of 
conservation when removed from source nations experiencing either armed 
conflict or significant economic strife. After all, this decreases the likelihood 
of damage due to bombardment and other martial movements, as well as
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damage from neglect, as source nations are forced to make difficult decisions 
regarding resources. Such concerns are indeed “especially relevant in Iraq, 
where resources have been, and are currently being diverted to the pressing 
problems of the population and the economy.”253 In such dire situations and 
the difficult decisions that they beget, artifacts can most surely be expected to 
hold a lower priority than preserving human life. “Because lives are lost in 
war, the goal of protecting property is controversial,” and though “the 
codification of the laws of war has attempted to protect, as much as possible, 
cultural property within an invaded nation,”254 as it has often been deemed a 
secondary concern to preserving human life, the “effect of war, poverty, 
political chaos, and instability on cultural heritage can be and often is 
devastating.”255
Additionally, with regard to cultural heritage preservation as a field 
of study, the artifacts and the heritage that they embody may enjoy a larger 
audience. By virtue of its physical remnants being exhibited to a larger 
audience abroad, Iraqi heritage could reach more individuals and communities 
than if they remained within Iraq’s borders. Such circulation has the realistic
253 Willis, p. 245
254 Paroff, Sasha P. “Another Victim of the War in Iraq: The Looting of the National
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potential to foster a wider appreciation for both Iraqi cultural achievements 
and those of Middle Eastern culture in general, at a time when this 
appreciation could be translated into more widespread support for the nation 
as it recovers from decades of oppression followed by years of armed conflict.
This more widespread enjoyment and admiration of Iraqi cultural 
accomplishments could, in turn, pave the way for increased solidarity in the 
international community with Iraq as the nation continues down the course of 
recovery. Such reconstruction can foster cultural heritage tourism, not to 
mention the social benefits for Iraqis from sparing destruction of common 
heritage amid the tribulations of modern conflict.
Though museum science in recent years has favored cultural 
internationalism, its benefits come with a cost; they may pose the threat of 
damage in another more intangible way. The cost of employing cultural 
internationalism in the museum’s recovery comes in the form of the loss of 
cultural nationalism’s benefits—namely, damage to the autonomy and 
sovereignty, collective identity, and long-term cultural heritage of the 
recovering Iraqi nation.
While the heritage may enjoy a larger audience by virtue of its 
physical remnants being exhibited to a larger audience abroad, and thus foster 
a wider appreciation for Iraqi and Middle Eastern culture, the benefit of 
exposure to this heritage they represent can have on the Iraqi people in terms
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of their national identity, pride, and social education amid calamity and strife 
may become sacrificed. “Cultural heritage preservation depends on its ability 
to serve and build constituencies in the population,” and this already 
difficult task becomes yet more arduous when the remnants of heritage are 
dispersed away from the population that needs this service. For these reasons, 
there is indeed a case for pursuing a culturally nationalistic approach in 
advancing the Iraq National Museum’s recovery.
Within the camp of scholarship promoting a museum recovery 
strategy rooted in cultural nationalism, advocacy for “the connectedness of the 
Iraqi people, themselves” being “the priority in deciding where to display 
Iraq’s artifacts”257 has been the central premise. The museum “has been a 
symbol of [their] emerging identity for all Iraqis, regardless of religious or 
tribal affiliation.”258 While such a national identity may be difficult to define 
and a purely common past may be difficult to identify, an “emphasis on the 
unity and history of the people of Iraq would be extremely beneficial to the 
Iraqi population” during this “state of upheaval and new beginnings,” and “the 
Iraqi people would benefit from the retention and proud display of their 
cultural property.”259 A museum recovery strategy rooted in cultural
256 Hitchcock, Ann. “Through the Fog of War in Iraq: Lessons Learned in Heritage
Preservation.” The George Wright FORUM. Vol. 20, No. 4 (2003), p. 37.
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nationalism could feasibly be the first step in advancing toward this outcome. 
This includes the financial benefit that cultural nationalism may pose for the 
recovering Iraq. The ability to draw scholars of a variety of disciplines from 
both within and without of Iraq can lead to the “development of cultural 
heritage tourism for local developing economies in Iraq,” and could form the 
basis for a “public relations and education campaign with local Iraqi people as 
to the long-term economic value of their heritage to them.”260
This tradeoff between acting in the best interest of the global 
community and acting in the best interest of the nation of Iraq exposes 
colonial undertones in the debate. In this sense, the “notion of stewardship 
can be “suspiciously self-serving.”261 While advocating for the cultural 
property to be in the international community as opposed to the source nation 
of Iraq, however altruistic the intentions may be, the world risks re-inscribing 
the colonial way of thought that has been present for years. Promoting “the 
notion that the Iraqi past is ‘our’ past” may give way to engaging in “a 
rhetorical strategy of appropriation.”262 This notion of a common past is 
rooted in Orientalism, which Edward Said and other scholars have defined as 
a Western interpretation of the East deeply influenced by a European imperial 
mindset and by which the West has defined itself through the lens of
260 Stone, p. 941
261 Hamilakis, p. 107
262 Hamilakis, p. 108
101
comparison with the East. After all, what it is really referencing a specific 
portion of Iraq’s past— “a selective and constructed past, the past that in the 
Western imagination has occupied a central position because of its biblical 
connotations, or its links to urbanism and early writing.”263
What may result is the “construction of Iraq as a country of the 
past, living in another time, a country that is ‘not immanent [sic] to 
modernity’—hence the frequent evocations of Mesopotamia.”264 This is 
indeed a “colonial way of thinking,”265 or at least a method of thought 
reminiscent of colonialism. By focusing on the promotion of a global sense of 
cultural heritage, as opposed to what may be in the best interests of the 
recovering Iraqi nation, the world risks potentially putting the interests of the 
developed Western world first at the expense of the developing Eastern world, 
much as colonialism did in Iraq during the previous century.
Unfortunately, an overwhelming amount of discussion has not 
acknowledged this colonial issue with regard to the Iraq National Museum’s 
recovery. The relationship between states and museums has only recently 
begun to be explored within the Western context, and is even newer in the 
Middle East.266 While the issue of repatriation has indeed been addressed
263 Hamilakis, p. 108
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concerning many of the previous century’s armed conflicts, it has not entered 
the discussion of the Iraq National Museum with frequency. The bulk of 
discussion has consisted of Western advocacy for the merits of internationalist 
approaches in the museum’s recovery, employing foreign aid and sponsorship 
in the name of protecting artifacts that are held sacred for patently Western 
values. What this overlooks is that, although many Arab societies trace their 
origins to ancient civilizations, they are often ruled by states created relatively 
recently by colonial powers, and there will often be calls “to ‘purify’ the 
historical record that nationalists view as having been distorted by 
colonialism.”267 Blindly ascribing to cultural internationalism can rob the 
Iraqi nation of the opportunity to do this and to forge a new identity as it 
recovers from years of strife, perhaps reviving a new brand of colonialism in 
the twenty-first century. At the same time, strict adherence to principles of 
cultural nationalism, however, may limit the appreciation of the artifacts 
themselves and deprive them of a place in the international community’s 
growing sense of global heritage.
267 Davis, Eric. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modem Iraq. 
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IV. The Iraq National Museum’s Past Ability to Divide and its Future
Potential to Unify
This section will demonstrate that, like all museums, the Iraq National 
Museum has had a long history o f being employed as a political instrument. 
This portion will also demonstrate that despite a track record o f division, the 
museum nonetheless retains a tremendous potential to sow the initial seeds o f 
unification. This discussion will show how this potential to unify encompasses 
both a return to normalcy and a fostering a unifying sense o f national identity, 
diversity, and heritage in post-war Iraq.
As a result, the museum and its collections will certainly prove 
valuable in the recovery o f the Iraqi nation from the U.S.-led war. In this 
process, the museum will act as a weather vane o f progress during the 
reconstruction. The museum’s potential must be harnessed by both scholars 
and policymakers in the United States, the new Iraq, and the world over as 
recovery from war advances.
Museums as Political Instruments
It has been well established that museums have long served broad 
social, cultural, educational purposes. We have learned from this analysis that 
museums are also frequently used as political instruments. The Iraq National 
Museum has certainly been no exception to either of these realities. Ever 
since its inception, the Iraq National Museum has had a long history of being 
employed as a political tool by British, Baathist, and most recently American, 
anti-coalition stakeholders, and cultural heritage professionals as well. The 
“unifying thread in this battle over Iraqi archaeology is power—economic, 
cultural, and political power—and how people have used these powers to
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manipulate archaeology in order to preserve their authority and/or to 
maximize their access to archaeological finds.”268
Since the war began in 2003, both the looters and their stolen items 
have both reinforced the museum’s status as a symbol of state power. The 
museum’s appropriation by various stakeholders for self-preservation has 
been central to discussions of the United States’ failure to anticipate and 
prevent the looting. Additionally, the resulting discussion concerning the 
merits of pursuing a museum recovery strategy rooted in either cultural 
nationalism or cultural internationalism has continued the museum’s history 
of being appropriated politically.
The looting underscores that, in Iraq as well as elsewhere, cultural 
heritage is connected to politics. “Ultimately, the demolition of much of Iraqi 
archaeological heritage was emblematic of the ruinous and violent politics of 
recent Iraqi history.”269 During peacetime, heritage engaged civil officials to 
promote national unity. During wartime, not only opposing militaries but 
downtrodden citizens appropriated and destroyed heritage objects. During the 
recovery from this conflict, the museum has been used by scholars and 
policymakers alike to both condemn and uphold controversial political 
agendas.
268 Bernhardsson, Magnus T. Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation
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Given its political resonance, the Iraq National Museum, like all 
museums, can be exploited for division or unification. The Iraq National 
Museum nonetheless retains a tremendous potential to sow the seeds of a 
nascent unity. It is imperative that this potential be recognized and harnessed 
by not only scholars, but policymakers as well, in both the United States and 
the new Iraq, as well as in the international community, as recovery from the 
years of war progresses.
The Museum’s Proven Ability to Divide
The Iraq National Museum has been used as an instrument of 
politics ever since its inception. Looking back to the British formation of 
modern-day Iraq and installation of the British-sponsored Faisal monarchy, 
Gertrude Bell exerted a great deal of influence during this time on the 
formation of the museum and its evolution within the country’s Ministry of 
Public Works.
The location of the Museum within this Ministry is meaningful. 
According to Bell’s legislation, the Department of Antiquities, and thus, the 
museum, was placed under the Ministry of Public Works rather than the 
Ministry of Education.270 This implied that the museum provided a public
270 Bernhardsson, p. 126
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service to citizens—a service less tangible than, perhaps, sanitation or utilities, 
but no less important. This service provided by the national museum was the 
beginnings of a national identity.
Indeed, archaeology has played a central role in the development 
of Iraqi national identity. “Ruling elites” had long “manipulated the past” for 
this purpose in Iraq.271 Gertrude Bell and her contemporaries were essentially 
resurrecting the Mesopotamian past for this purpose. Linking archaeology 
with identity continued during the Baathist regime from 1968 to 2003. During 
this time, Saddam Hussein rose to power in 1979 and employed the museum’s 
collections to portray himself as the heir to ancient Babylon, and the 
perception of the museum as a physical manifestation of Baathist power 
would later come to fuel a large portion of the looting and destruction that 
took place in April 2003. The looting and destruction that the citizen looters 
wrought upon the museum was the most obvious confirmation of this 
connection, with the destruction being a visible manifestation of the internal 
anger and frustration felt by generations oppressed by Baathist policies.
In the years after the initial invasion, during the longer period of 
insurgency, factions within Iraq’s fledgling government appropriated the 
museum to sow both anti-occupation discord and self-advancement. With the
271 Joffe, Alexander H. “Museum Madness in Baghdad.” Middle East Quarterly. (Spring 
2004), p. 32.
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State Board of Antiquities and Heritage being directed by two ministries—the 
Sunni-controlled Ministry of Culture and the Shiite-run Ministry of Tourism 
and Antiquities— “politically motivated efforts have rendered it virtually 
ineffective.”272 It is with relative ease that one can perceive how the museum, 
despite being an institution “designed to protect Iraq’s cultural heritage,” by 
virtue of falling under the jurisdiction of this now-factional State Board of 
Antiquities and Heritage, “[had become] exploited” by rival factions “for 
political gain.”273
As the new government took shape, the museum’s new location 
became notable. In 2006, “the museum was reassigned to the Ministry of 
Tourism and Antiquities under the control of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada 
al-Sadr” while international archaeologists urged the new Iraqi government to 
place its cultural heritage under the Ministry of Culture where a “strong, 
national, nonpolitical State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, backed fully by 
the force of the State, [could] preserve the heritage that [was] left.”274 The 
museum and its contents occupy a central place in the economic and symbolic 
benefits of heritage tourism. Many observers, however, remain skeptical and 
question what portion of this maneuver may have been accomplished to
272 Detwiler, Elizabeth. “Iraq’s Cultural Heritage: Preserving the Past for the Sake of the
Future.” United States Institute of Peace. October Briefing (2008), p. 2.
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maintain Shiite control of the museum after years under Sunni Baathist 
control.
Additionally, during this time, public officials tellingly drew the 
distinction between Islamic artifacts and Mesopotamian artifacts, granting 
permission for citizens to loot Mesopotamian artifacts but not Islamic ones.275 
The implication was that the Islamic heritage was not lootable, presumably by 
virtue of it being sacred, while the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian heritage was 
lootable by virtue of it being profane in comparison.
Furthermore, “there is a significant link between smugglers of 
cultural property and smugglers of weapons.”276 United States officials have 
frequently caught insurgents in possession of both weapons and antiquities. In 
fact, the illicit trade in antiquities has become a growing source of revenue for 
insurgents to fund terrorism as more traditional means have been combated.277 
Long after the invasion, “the scenario [had] been repeated many times,”278 as 
security forces pursued leads for weapons and insurgents, they frequently 
found antiquities, finding “vases, cylinder seals, and statuettes” along with 
other “tools of their trade,” such as automatic weapons, ammunition, and
275 Jenkins, Simon. “In Iraq's Four-year Looting Frenzy, the Allies Have Become the
Vandals.” The Guardian. Vol. 6, No. 8 (2007), p. 2.
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uniforms.279 Government agents have been keen to point out the use of 
heritage as a weapon in this struggle. The association indicates this obscured 
reality. Symbolically, artifacts were being collocated with weapons because 
the cultural heritage embodied within these artifacts was itself also being 
employed as a weapon.
Within Iraq, coalition members, mainly United States soldiers and 
officials, were also complicit. For many, their “collusion in such destruction” 
of Iraq's heritage was “a scandal that will outlive any passing conflict.”280 
This encompassed their role in the looting and destruction by virtue of neither 
anticipating it nor halting it, as well as any shortcomings in artifact recovery 
efforts.
Outside of Iraq, the museum was also used as a device to either 
condemn or justify U.S. foreign policy around the 2003 invasion. Opponents 
and critics of U.S. foreign policy used the museum and its plight as a device to 
condemn U.S. war efforts. As the invasion approached, “archaeologists often 
played a role in campus teach-ins and off-campus protests” and thus “cast 
their opposition to the war in terms of the war’s threat to the common heritage 
of mankind ... claiming that the entire country of Iraq had to be treated like a
279 Bogdanos (2008), p. 730
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museum piece.”281 Tragically, this aversion to appearing complicit in the war 
effort led hesitation among some to risk the perception of endorsing the 
invasion by offering hands-on aid to the U.S. in taking more widespread 
precautionary measures to protect the museum.
Many heritage professionals questioned whether it was ethical to 
work with the military, specifically in situations such as the contested Iraq 
war. A number of archaeologists were disinclined to work with military. 
Chief reasons for this stance included the claims that all of Iraq is “a vast 
archaeological site” and that “providing a list of selected sites” to avoid might 
give the armies “carte blanche” to operate destructively elsewhere, that 
collusion itself was “a political ... gesture” since no invasion could ever be 
justified,282 as well as that advising administration officials with regard to 
cultural property amounted to collusion in the war’s preparation and thus 
provided “academic and cultural legitimacy” to the invasion.283
In this dialog, the museum became exploited by a number of 
foreign stakeholders. As previously discussed, one need only look to 
supporters of the American war effort at home criticizing the exaggerated 
claims that resulted from the looting and critics of the invasion using the
281 Joffe, p. 34
282 Curtis, John. “Relations between Archaeologists and the Military in the Case of Iraq.”
Papers from the Institute of Archaeology. Vol. 19 (2009), p. 5.
283 Hamilakis, Yannis. “Iraq, Stewardship and ‘The Record’: An Ethical Crisis for
Archaeology.” Public Archaeology. Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), p. 107.
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events at the museum to highlight the cultural tragedy of the looting in order 
to witness the degree to which many used the plight of the museum during the 
conflict to offer either support or condemnation of the administration’s 
policies. While this may not be the same tangible level of appropriation that 
states and armies have practiced with the museum in the past, it is nonetheless 
self-serving in the same manner.
The White House’s and State Department’s act of initially 
downplaying the disaster revealed its underlying anger and embarrassment, 
and the decision to open the museum for a two-hour media event in July 2003 
revealed the administration’s “[eagerness] to put the controversy behind 
them.” Those supporting the war also voiced an alarmingly wide array of 
inaccurate narratives concerning the looting to justify the U.S. decision to 
invade—e.g., that the Iraqi populace must not have cared about their own 
heritage since they chose to plunder it, or that the Iraqis took such pride in 
their heritage that they were compelled to symbolically seize it back from the 
Baathist regime and protect it from destruction in the fog of war.
In this light, the employment of the museum for purposes of 
propaganda emerges—an action that did not go unnoticed by the Iraqi people. 
Some Middle Easter news commentary lamented the positive propaganda
284 Lawler, Andrew. “Mayhem in Mesopotamia.” Science. Vol. 301 (August 2003), pp. 587- 
588.
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messages coming from the U.S. officials,285 in contrast with the “horrid” 
looting and “atmosphere of lawlessness” stemming from inadequate patrolling 
after the fall of Baghdad.286 The new Iraqi government, however, did no 
better. Six years later, like the United States, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
held another reopening ceremony for the museum and declared his 
administration’s desire for the museum to be “at the forefront of international 
museums” and for Iraq to be a “Mecca for research” into the history of 
mankind.287 Some coverage was keen to note the political opportunism 
behind this reopening, remarking how it was done “in haste for political 
purposes to boost [the prime minister’s] image and demonstrate to the public 
that life [was] returning to normal in Iraq.”288
Turning to cultural heritage professionals, many find such 
individuals to remain the only unblemished party. Indeed, the efforts of Dr. 
George and the small staff that remained were commendable, as were the 
efforts of numerous heritage professionals who advocated for the museum 
amid the calamity, but after years of Baathist collusion, avoiding any sense of 
complicity is difficult for the museum as an institution. The majority of
285 US gives world ‘happy’ Iraq news. (2003, June 8). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
286 Bremer: Not enough troops in Iraq. (2004, October 5). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://w w w. alj azeera. com/.
287 Iraq reopens looted national museum. (2009, February 24). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
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288 Reopening Iraq’s museum. (2009, March 14). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
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scholars have remained convinced of the curators’ blamelessness, remarking 
that “they may have been Baathists, but they weren’t criminals.”289 
Unfortunately, however, the appearance of impropriety is often conflated with 
impropriety itself, a sentiment that has no doubt cast a cloud over the 
institution of the museum.
Museum and heritage professionals, thus, are not entirely exempt 
from culpability in appropriating the museum for their own benefit. Scholarly 
exploitation of Iraq is indeed a reality. Western professors have occasionally 
been caught smuggling artifacts out of Iraq, something which Middle Eastern 
news outlets have made a point of highlighting.290 In addition to this, a 
significant number of heritage professionals effectively “leveraged guilt into 
resources” by “[producing] shock and grief at [the] loss of such unprecedented 
magnitude” and “[provoking] rage at the cultural callousness of the United 
States in failing to prevent this predictable tragedy.”291 Some good arguably 
stemmed from this. After all, there is “more interest in Mesopotamian 
archaeology now than there ever has been,”292 and there is “a significantly
289 Curtis, p. 3
290 Iraqi museum gets priceless pieces back. (2005, January 19). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
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greater awareness ... of the importance of the cultural heritage and the 
responsibilities” of governments “to protect it.”293
Despite the good stemming from this, one could also make the case 
for it having engendered some bad as well. Though scholars gained favorable 
interest in the issue, it was arguably unethical, however, to disguise self- 
interest as service to humanity. Furthermore, years of association with the 
Baathist regime can be viewed as unethical. This produced an appearance of 
corruption or impropriety with Baathists on staff and Hussein relatives in 
leadership that many journalists have referred to as a “cloud [hanging] over 
the museum.”294
Additionally, the biased response of Western archaeologists in 
favor of access to excavations at any cost obfuscated years of “continual 
complicity with the [Baathist] regime.”295 It is no secret that Saddam 
Hussein’s obsession with Babylonian heritage created ideal working 
conditions for Western archaeologists, which many capitalized upon while 
turning a blind eye to the regime’s brutal actions elsewhere. While this was 
not true of all archaeologists in Iraq, it was prevalent enough to trigger cries of 
archaeology unethically mingling with regimes and armed forces. Given the
293 Stone, Peter. “The Identification and Protection of Cultural Heritage during the Iraq
Conflict: A Peculiarly English Tale.” Antiquity. Vol. 79 (2005), p. 942.
294 Lawler, p. 585
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application of such leverage after years of complicity, the “pursuit of self- 
interest” appears to have been disguised “beneath the language of service to 
the heritage of humankind or the Iraqi people.”296
Ultimately, this amounted to a sacking of the culture reminiscent 
of colonialism that continues today. Though not frequently mentioned in the 
discourse, the irony behind the American administration seeking to protect 
artifacts that it had put in danger in the first place was palpable.297 
Additionally, recalling that the notion of a shared heritage was the motive 
voiced by many to protect Iraq’s cultural property, it cannot be ignored that 
this was a “rhetorical strategy of appropriation” that aided in the “construction 
of Iraq as a country of the past, living in another time, a country that is ‘not 
immanent [sic] to modernity’.”298
A1 Jazeera coverage in the aftermath of the looting underscores 
this. This commentary showed how the Iraq National Museum was not the 
only bastion of heritage that suffered from the looting. Rather, smaller 
regional museums, archaeological sites, libraries, and heritage institutions 
suffered no less. Some coverage focused on the loss of film heritage, noting 
how the looting of public institutions destroyed the national theatre and
296 Joffe, p. 40
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116
destroyed master reels of the earliest Iraqi films forever.299,300 The coverage 
also paid a fair amount of attention to site looting in Iraq. By 2004, Middle 
Eastern commentators noted how the museum was last year’s focus and how 
the looting of smaller museums in southern Iraq by increasingly organized 
gangs301 and unexcavated site looting were the more current travesties against 
heritage.302 Reports of the World Monument Fund declaring all of Iraq to be 
“an endangered site”—the first time this had been declared for an entire 
country—underscored the attention paid to cultural heritage not housed within 
the national museum.303
Furthermore, former Director of the Iraq National Museum Dr. 
Donny George voiced his opinion that the British Museum was the obvious 
partner in helping the museum recover from this tragedy.304 Considered in 
tandem with success stories focusing on high-value items missing from 
museum profiles on high profile items, such as the Warka Mask being 
recovered with the help of “saviors” like a New York prosecutor and
299 Iraq’s film veterans lament loss. (2006, July 3). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
300 Iraq war flick marks industry comeback. (2003, October 1). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
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policeman,305 as well as six hundred missing artifacts being found at the prime 
minister’s office and displayed at the museum,306 one must acknowledge the 
parallels between this sentiment and the nation’s colonial past. In this regard, 
considering the wanton destruction of cultural property amid the armed 
conflict of the invasion and the search for rescue from Western sources, it 
appeared that “we have advanced little since the imperial nineteenth 
century.”307
What emerges from this examination is the reality that the Iraq 
National Museum has had a long history of being used as a political tool. This 
history is likely to be far from over. Complicit parties in this misappropriation 
included the United States and other foreign stakeholders, the new Iraqi 
government, as well as cultural heritage professionals.
The Museum's Potential to Signify a Return to Normalcy
Despite this potential to be used as a political tool to divide, the 
museum nonetheless retains a rich potential to foster some future semblance 
of unification. The museum and its collections may prove valuable as an 
indicator of a post-war return to normalcy within Iraq, by virtue of the fact
305 Iraq’s Mona Lisa returns. (2003, September 24). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http:// www. alj azeera.com/.
306 Iraq recovers lost artefacts [sic]. (2010, September 21). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
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that increased conservation will result when the security situation improves, 
and foment a nascent sense of identity upon which to further unify. Given 
how many Iraqis saw it as symbolic of the greater breakdown of order, it 
should come as no surprise that the museum is used as a gauge for the 
recovery from this breakdown. Hence, success stories that are highlighted 
ultimately exploit the museum for political purposes.
A number of efforts within Iraq’s new government have improved 
the conservation of cultural heritage as the nation recovers. For instance, the 
Iraqi government established the Iraq Cultural Heritage Conservation 
Initiative within the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage to increase the 
capacity to “document, manage, and conserve the country’s cultural heritage 
through training, support for academic education, development of methods for 
site documentation and assessment.”308 As the security situation in Iraq 
improves, this initiative will increasingly undertake missions to evaluate and 
assist in the conservation of national cultural sites and institutions. More 
recently, the museum has been working with Google to digitize its collections. 
Amira Edan, the museum’s current director, has declared her aspiration of this 
project “[marking] another step toward normalcy,” while others have voiced 
hope that such efforts will “show that it’s possible to do business in Iraq, that
308 Palumbo, Gaetano. ‘The State of Iraq's Cultural Heritage in the Aftermath of the 2003 
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Iraq is an important market that will grow quickly, that it’s sufficiently stable 
... and that it’s a safe place to be.”309
Given such efforts and the previous climate permissive to the 
looting of antiquities, one potential metric of a return to normalcy in Iraq may 
be when the nation can protect the remnants of its own cultural heritage 
without foreign aid. After all, when “cultural heritage is sacrificed, it is likely 
that many other aspects of life that mark us as human beings are also being 
sacrificed.”310 As assistance programs in Iraq, both foreign and domestic, 
help to grow expertise, “Iraq may soon be able to independently undertake the 
protection and management of its cultural heritage,” with the measure of 
success “not [being] evident in the number of monuments saved, but in the 
capacity of Iraq to save them independent of foreign help.”311 The Museum 
can, therefore, act as a weather vane of progress in reconstruction.
In the midst of armed conflict, as well as periods of recovery from 
such strife, cultural property has the potential to educate and unify cultures, as 
well as to preserve a sense of identity that could otherwise be lost. It is well 
established that, for countless generations, art and craft that has now become 
cultural property “has been used to illustrate the life styles and important
309 Google to put Iraqi museum online. (2009, November 24). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
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aspects of civilizations,” and it has remained “an important source of 
continuing education for a unifying social culture, especially in the rebuilding 
process after armed conflict.”312 In this light, the educational value of the 
remnants of cultural heritage is, arguably, at its most important during such 
times of strife. If, for centuries of armed conflict, the destruction of a group’s 
cultural heritage has amounted to the elimination of their identity and 
“[facilitated] the degradation of that society,”313 then safeguarding and 
exhibiting cultural property during strife could, conversely, achieve the 
preservation of that identity and promote admiration for that culture both at 
home and in the international community.
Much like the act of blogging has, in recent years, pointed the 
mainstream press to storylines that really matter to populations, the museum’s 
holdings may be able to similarly point widespread elements of international 
society to what really matters to Iraqis. Benefits may include providing a 
voice to overlooked scholars of cultural heritage, a wider awareness for 
unvoiced causes, and an “alternative source” of information in countries long 
“under the thumb” of the state.314
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The Museum’s Capacity to Foster National Unity
Aside from a return to normalcy, the museum can foster an Iraqi 
national identity and sense of pride. The museum has long been “a powerful 
tool that has promoted group identity in Iraq and provided meaning for 
countless Iraqis during periods of intense political and social change.”315 At 
the turn of the previous century, Gertrude Bell’s work tapped an emerging 
sense of nationalism, giving the Iraqis control over their heritage and, thus, 
control over their past as well. Bell “was not the instigator of nationalist ideas
in the county, for they were already emerging,” but “she gave the people of
/■
Iraq control over their antiquities and therefore control over their past.”
This sense of nationalism that the museum embodied is vital for the success of
i n
new nations, “an essential component for a new country to be successful.”
Bell saw this potential in the early twentieth century, noting that 
“displays of ancient Mesopotamian achievements would bolster Iraqi 
confidence in the future of the new nation.”318 These hopes, however, are not 
new to the twenty-first century. Rather, it is equally true now as it was at the 
turn of the twentieth century when the nation was formed. As a result, the 
museum can remain a symbol of emerging identity for all Iraqis, regardless of
315 Bemhardsson, p. 220
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religion or tribe. The Iraqi people can look to this common heritage and draw 
upon it to redefine nationhood after years of division and conflict. More 
importantly, the Iraqi people can draw their own conclusions from this history 
and produce their own narratives, not just those that Western nations would 
favor. This is imperative in order to avoid simply repeating colonialism’s 
effects in the twenty-first century.
There is now similar hope that these same secular pre-Islamic 
artifacts might bolster Iraqi confidence and pride in the nation, which can 
counter religious and tribal strife in the modern era. Just as a sense of unity 
was previously “developed during a restless and chaotic era immediately 
following independence,” a nation-building process similarly based on ancient 
history and archaeology may occur.319 The “museum’s holdings consist 
almost entirely of pre-Islamic art, some as old as 6,000 years.”320 While may 
seem counterintuitive that Islamists would value pre-Islamic artifacts, plenty 
of ruling elites have been enamored with the feelings of Mesopotamian 
exceptionalism they inspire, so it stands to reason that the same could be true 
for commoners as well. These artifacts are “rich with common ancestry that 
predates the splits among Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite.”321 It stands to reason 
that in today’s Iraq, “where religious and tribal differences create a divisive
319 Bemhardsson, pp. 165, 218
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and violent climate,” this secular history that “juxtaposes against the Islamic 
radicalism and sectarianism at the root of violence in the country today” holds 
the “potential to create a sense of historical unity .”322
As many scholars have noted, cultural heritage preservation thrives 
upon inclusivity. It “depends on its ability to serve and build constituencies in 
the population at large,” with no group feeling disenfranchised or left 
behind.323 In order for cultural heritage preservation “to be successful,” it 
“must have meaning for everyone and be the concern of all.”324 This notion 
of inclusivity leads to “the perception of a common culture and common past” 
that is “one way of learning that one is part of a community. The very power 
of ... artifacts [has been] in their ability to use symbols and imagery to 
provide a sense of belonging to a group or community, a fundamental element 
of patriotism.”325
To this end, rather than merely propping up the ruling party’s 
historical narrative, the museum can give special voice to multiple 
communities by addressing Iraq’s long overlooked diversity, even if 
respective historic narratives are conflicting. This can and should include 
specific attention to the deeply felt tribal and religious differences that the
322 Stevens, p. 3
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U.S. initially ignored in its war planning. By virtue of predating modern-day 
strife, the Mesopotamian period stands poised as a solid common ground and 
a potential building block upon which to begin the long-term process of 
circumventing the modern splits among Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite.
In addressing the nation’s diversity and competing historical 
narratives, the museum can provide context to the many eras of strife within 
Iraqi heritage. If “the Iraqi nation is to fully recover from the trauma of its 
past, it will need to come to terms with that past and seek motivation and 
guidance in its history,” and the avenue upon which to do so may be found in 
the nation’s rich ancient history embodied in the national museum’s 
holding.327
Context is vital to the field of archaeology. For this reason, 
artifacts are able to draw attention to “context-specific power relationships, 
class and other social inequalities and asymmetries.” In the case of the Iraq 
National Museum, therefore, context can communicate broader truths to the 
citizenry concerning broad elements such as Mesopotamian roots, the Islamic 
faith, periods of British colonialism and early nationhood, years of Baathist 
alienation, and the U.S. invasion and subsequent new government.
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This is in sharp contrast to the years of cultural heritage 
preservation in Iraq being “less concerned with answering universal, all- 
engrossing questions,” but rather with “an explanation of how contemporary 
Iraqis are the inheritors and descendants of certain ancient peoples and their 
civilizations. This construction has been deliberate ... with political purposes 
in mind ... to appeal to the citizens nationwide and thus be suggestive of how 
Iraq’s history is genealogical and linear and not multidimensional.”329
One must remain aware, however, that this gives people the power 
to do as they wish with their own heritage. Recalling that “a national museum 
is bound to have potential in the state-building process in a recently 
established nation such as Iraq, with its numerous ethnic and religious 
groups,” museums “seldom attempt to present the complexity of history or to 
accentuate differing interpretations.”330 As multiple narratives are addressed, 
some are bound to be conflicting. Being aware that “the ethic of conservation 
is a context-specific principle ... some social groups may choose to place 
value not on the conservation of the material past but on its reworking, 
recycling, or even destruction.”331 If the Iraqi populace gaining control over 
their antiquities amounted to control over the heritage that is embodied in the
329 Bemharssson, p. 219
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331 Hamilakis, p. 108
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artifacts, then having control of this past must include the freedom to present 
and address it as they best see fit.
The Museum’s Role Moving Forward
National museums are to be considered an outward sign of 
independent nations. After all, they are “the first physical manifestation of a 
country’s independence, as a sign of that country’s claim to its place” among 
the world’s great nations.332 The Iraq National Museum, then, should not be 
considered any different. As “the new governments in the Middle East fought 
with the old imperial powers and structures ... to exercise full authority over 
cultural resources” in an attempt to be “more fully in control of their destiny,” 
the Iraq National Museum was “most fitting for the newly independent 
country” as “the massive amounts of artifacts” in its holdings could also be 
“displayed for the enrichment of public cultural life.”333 The same remains 
equally true today. The reopening and proper functioning of the Iraq National 
Museum may simultaneously educate the Iraqi people of this independence 
and signal the nation’s rightful place to the international community. After 
all, if this is the U.S. goal in Iraq—to return the nation to a pre-totalitarian
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state of affairs—then the museum’s restoration and functioning is equally in 
the best interests of the U.S. as it is of the Iraqis.
Moving forward, this potential to unite must be harnessed by 
scholars and policymakers alike. Though abundant now, the nation’s oil 
resources will eventually be depleted, but antiquities will always remain. As a 
resource, antiquities are indeed plentiful within Iraq’s borders and more are 
waiting to be tapped. In fact, the areas yet to be formally excavated and 
cataloged in the museum is four times greater than the museum’s collections 
and the areas formally excavated in the past hundred years.334 It is with peril 
that the role that heritage plays in nation-building is overlooked. If the “center 
of gravity” of United States counterinsurgency operations “is the people, then 
their cultural heritage is the conscience of the people, often serving as ... a 
visible symbol of their society.”335
The United States must incorporate cultural property protection 
into its future post-conflict stabilization operations abroad.336 Naturally, this 
would entail not only recognizing the formidable power that cultural heritage 
possesses, but also allowing for the benefit of its influence to be exerted. As 
United States doctrine evolves, cultural heritage protection must be a focal
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point in both counterinsurgency and stability operations in the future. The 
unifying potential posed by the museum can and must be capitalized upon to 
signify a return to peace in Iraq, but perhaps more importantly to solidify its 
national identity, as well as to preserve this rich and ancient heritage well into 
future generations.
It is, however, important to recall the British influence in the 
formation of the Iraq National Museum, comprehending that the Iraqi 
populace essentially inherited their national museum rather than creating it. 
After all, the museum’s “establishment was not the result of wealthy 
patronage or philanthropy;” rather “initial efforts for creating the Museum 
were performed by non-Iraqis,” with the subtext of reflecting an Iraq 
“designed to be a compliant country that would honor faithfully Britain’s local 
strategic and economic interests.” 337 The museum is now in the unique 
position to break from these colonial roots and assert Iraq’s new identity in the 
twenty-first century rather than reinforcing its post-colonial identity of 
yesteryear.
If museums are symbols of power, then it stands to reason that the 
Iraq National Museum can empower a people just as it has done for regimes. 
This can, in turn, ensure long-term preservation of artifacts and longevity of 
scholarship, as a profound resonance with the populace and a collective
337 Bemhardsson, pp. 150, 109
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identity or conscience are the first steps in securing the survival of material 
culture. Only when this occurs can cultural property be more certain of 
enduring preservation.
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Conclusion and Summary
The looting o f the Iraq National Museum in 2003 sparked debates over 
responsibility and questions concerning the appropriate approach to museum 
reconstruction. These debates reveal the symbolic power o f the museum as an 
institution—a power that history has shown to be capable o f division, but 
nonetheless retains tremendous potential fo r unification.
In the wake o f the looting of the Iraq National Museum during the 
2003 U.S.-led invasion, an analysis o f the looters, the materials looted, and 
the permissive socio-cultural environment reveals the cultural heritage 
embodied in the museum’s holdings to have been appropriated by all 
stakeholders for the purpose o f furthering their own competing interests.
The majority o f debate arising from these events centered on the 
United States’ possible violation o f international law and whether a theory of 
cultural nationalism or internationalism is most appropriate in repairing the 
museum. This discussion highlighted several conundrums facing heritage 
protection and preservation. Debate over U.S. responsibility for the looting 
revealed the inadequacy o f legislation alone in protecting cultural heritage, 
while debates between approaches o f cultural nationalism or internationalism 
as the proper path forward revealed a tragic tradeoff between what may be 
ideal for the global community and what may be in the best interests o f the 
Iraqi nation.
Despite the museum’s proven potential to divide, it nonetheless retains 
tremendous future potential to unify. This must be capitalized upon by 
heritage professionals and policy makers alike to signify a return to normalcy 
in Iraq and to preserve its national identity, diversity, and heritage.
Looting is a phenomenon that so violates social mores that 
episodes of it merit examination, particularly when the loot is cultural 
property. The literature on the topic has shown potential looters, an 
availability of valued goods, an absence of restraining factors, and a 
permissive socio-cultural environment to be the four key contributors of
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episodes of looting, as well as economic, symbolic, and selective to be the 
main three distinct types of looting.
This thesis examined the 2003 looting of the Iraq National 
Museum under this lens and found that the looting episode had both economic 
and symbolic significance. As expected, all four contributing components 
were present leading up to the 2003 looting of the Iraq museum and, notably, 
all three types of looting occurred as the museum’s contents were ransacked.
Four distinct stakeholders emerged in this analysis—invading U.S. 
forces, outgoing Baathist officials, museum staff, and Iraqi citizens—each 
having different competing values of cultural heritage and its preservation. 
The opposition between these four groups revealed the cultural heritage 
embodied in the museum’s holdings to have been appropriated by all four 
parties for the purpose of furthering their own competing interests.
The next sections recalled the debate that arose from these events, 
and attempted to cull larger revelations from these discussions. The majority 
of dialogue can be categorized as pertaining to whether the U.S. violated 
international law and whether a theory of cultural nationalism or 
internationalism is most appropriate in repairing the museum.
This essay showed how the primary arguments supporting the 
United States having violated international law focus on reading the intent
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behind relevant international tenets within a spirit of national harmony with 
international standards, while most opinion against a violation of international 
law focus on a more literal reading of the law and minimal obligations toward 
compliance.
Thus, this thesis has argued that relevant legislation at the national 
and international levels is a not only flawed but inherently insufficient means 
to protect cultural heritage. Rather, a true national desire and legitimate 
conviction to protect cultural property must accompany any legislation in 
order to achieve effective cultural heritage protection.
The third section demonstrated that the prevailing preference 
among museum professionals has been to favor cultural internationalism. It 
argued that approaches rooted in cultural nationalism tend to be better for the 
source nation of the artifacts, while cultural internationalism often benefits the 
artifacts themselves, the field of study, and the global community. This 
debate revealed a bitter tradeoff between the best foreign interests and those of 
the recovering Iraqi nation.
The final section of this thesis argued that the Iraq National 
Museum, like most museums, has had a long history of being employed as a 
political tool, and called attention to its proven track record of fostering a 
spirit of division. This discussion recounted how use of the museum as an 
instrument of politics began with the British formation of modern-day Iraq
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and installation of the Faisal monarchy, continued with the Baathist regime’s 
use of the museum to legitimize their claim to power by way of connecting 
itself to the region’s past glories, and again surfaced as the United States and 
the new Iraqi government also appropriating the museum to legitimize their 
efforts during the longer period of insurgency that followed. All the while, 
the museum was also used as a device to either condemn or justify U.S. 
foreign policy regarding the invasion and occupation both in the U.S. and the 
international community.
Nevertheless, cultural property retains the potential to educate and 
unify cultures, as well as to preserve a sense of identity that could otherwise 
be lost in the midst of armed conflict and periods of recovery from strife. As 
a result, this analysis revealed the museum’s role as a weather vane of 
progress in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and its ample potential to sow 
the seeds of a nascent unification despite its discordant history.
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APPENDIX—BACKGROUND ON WORKS CITED
This examination of the looting of the Iraq National Museum made use of a 
variety of types of sources in order to address the legal and policy 
implications of these events from an interdisciplinary standpoint. It consulted 
sources that examine the psychology of looting in general, as well as 
economists and contemporary historians to illustrate what could have led to 
these events. It looked to the journalistic coverage from shortly after the 
looting occurred in order to gauge both the Western and the Middle Eastern 
reaction. It also consulted jurisprudence and legal opinion to examine what 
preventative measures could and should have been done, as well as museum 
and heritage professionals to entertain proposals of what may be pursued in 
the museum’s recovery. These sources are categorized below to provide 
further context.
Domestic Heritage Professionals
Robert McC. Adams—Archaeologist and professor of anthropology known 
for pioneering research in Iraq and multiethnic violence, and former 
Secretary of the Smithsonian
James Cuno—Art historian, President and Director of the Art Institute of 
Chicago, and former Director of Harvard University Art Museums
Eric Davis—Author and professor of political science, Director of the Center 
for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University
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Benjamin Foster—Professor of Mesopotamian literature, and economic and 
social history
Karen Polinger Foster—Professor of Bronze Age art and iconography
Laura Gawron—Master of Arts in Museum Professions
McGuire Gibson—Professor of Mesopotamian Archaeology at the University 
of Chicago’s Oriental Institute and President of American Association 
for Research in Baghdad
Alexander Joffe—Archaeologist and professor of Near Eastern studies, as 
well as associate of Global Policy Exchange, Ltd. (an organization 
focusing on the role of culture in international affairs)
John Russell—Professor of art, as well as former Deputy Advisor to the Iraqi 
Minister of Culture and the Coalition Provisional Authority
Foreign Heritage Professionals
Magnus Bemhardsson—Icelandic professor of Near East history with a focus 
on archaeology and nationalism in the modem Middle East
Joaquin Marfa Cordoba —Spanish professor, researcher, and archaeologist 
with the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
John Curtis—Keeper of the Department of the Middle East at the British 
Museum
Yannis Hamilakis—Cretan Professor of archaeology with a focus on the
historically contingent nature of archaeology as a device of Western 
modernity and the socio-politics of archaeology, founder of Radical 
Archaeology Forum, and well-known advocate of politically 
committed archaeological practice
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Erin Lewis—Archaeology student writing for a student-run journal at the 
University of York (U.K.)
Gabriel Moshenska—U.K. professor of public archaeology with a focus on 
nationalistic constructions of past and civilian experience of war
Gaetano Palumbo—Italian archaeologist specializing in Middle Eastern 
archaeology, conservation specialist at the Getty Conservation 
Institute, and former Director of Archaeological Conservation at the 
World Monuments Fund
Peter Stone—U.K. professor interested in the ethics of cultural heritage
experts working with militaries, former Chief Executive Officer of the 
World Archaeological Congress, and former archaeological advisor to 
the British Ministry of Defence prior to the Iraq invasion
Middle Eastern Heritage Professionals
Joanne Bajjaly—Independent archaeologist and journalist covering the 
Middle East
Donny George—Iraqi professor of Asian and Asian-American studies, former 
Director of the Iraq National Museum at the time of the invasion, 
former faculty member at the University of Baghdad
Nada Shabout—Professor of modern Iraqi art, Ajnerican of Iranian descent 
who spent a significant portion of her youth in Iraq
Lamia Al-Gailani Werr—Iraqi archaeologist and historian of the Ancient Near 
East, former advisor to the Iraq Museum by the Iraqi Reconstruction 
and Development Council in Baghdad, and honorary member of the 
British School of Archaeology in Iraq and a valued advisor to its 
Council.
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Military and Government Agents
Matthew Bogdanos—U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Colonel and New York
assistant district attorney with advanced degrees in classics, law, and 
military strategy who has been decorated for efforts as the former 
leader of the U.S. investigation into the looting of the Iraq National 
Museum and artifact recovery effort and continues to hunt for stolen 
antiquities at the district attorney’s office
Elizabeth Detwiler—Program assistant at the Center for Post-conflict Peace 
and Stability Operations (a team dedicated to social and economic 
reconstruction) at the U.S. Institute of Peace (an independent 
institution established and funded by Congress to promote global 
peace-building efforts)
Lt. Erin Stevens—Army reservist and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
who studied Cultural Policy and Arts Management at University 
College—Dublin and has written on the subject for the University of 
Military Intelligence
Ann Hitchcock—Chief Curator for the U.S. National Park Service who is 
active in the service’s Museum Management Program
Dick Jackson—Special Assistant to the Army Judge Advocate General for 
Law of War Matters, retired U.S. Army Colonel with experience as 
legal advisor in joint and combined operations in Iraq, and former 
NATO legal advisor
Lawrence Kumins—Specialist in energy policy in the Resources, Science, and 
Industry Divisions of the Congressional Research Service
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Jurisprudence— Professors, attorneys, and legal journalists
Reem Bahdi—Canadian professor of human rights and national security laws, 
particularly in the Palestinian context, former Director of the Women’s 
Human Rights Resources project at the University of Toronto
Patty Gerstenblith—U.S. professor of law with a focus on cultural heritage 
law, Chairman of the Lawyer’s Committee for Cultural Heritage 
Preservation, member of the President’s Cultural Property Advisory 
Committee from 2000-2003, and Editor in Chief for International 
Journal of Cultural Property
Edythe Huang—Attorney with a focus on civil international law, former 
Editor in Chief of Race and the Law Review at Rutgers University
John Henry Merryman—U.S. professor of law and internationally renowned 
expert on art and cultural property law, as well as comparative law
Jordan Paust—U.S. professor of international law who is among the most 
cited of American law professors and has served on a number of 
committees regarding international law, human rights, laws of war, 
terrorism, and the use of force
Ian Ralby—American international law attorney based in Europe and former 
clerk for the Iraq Special Tribunal with a practice focusing on 
expertise in international criminal law, international conflict 
resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction
A number of students, practitioners, and legal journalists in international and 
comparative law who have written on the topic of ethical lawyering in 
the Global War on Terrorism, including: Courtney Campbell, Amy 
Miller, Sasha Paroff, Kirsten Petersen, William Smith, Matthew 
Thurlow, and Lindsay Willis
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Other— Journalists, Think Tanks, Professors, etc.
A number of A1 Jazeera in English articles
Neal Ascherson—Scottish journalist for The Guardian, editor at Public
Archaeology, and visiting professor at the Institute of Archaeology at 
University College—London
Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell—American political science and
international affairs professors that have actively written and blogged 
on the looting of the Iraq National Museum
Elizabeth Ferris and Matthew Hall—Directors of the Brookings—London
School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement with a focus on 
the international community’s response to humanitarian crises
Scott Harding—Assistant Professor at the School of Social Work at the 
University of Connecticut
Simon Jenkins—Award-winning journalist for The Guardian, former U.K. 
Deputy Chairman of English Heritage
Andrew Lawler—Freelance writer who has written extensively on Middle
Eastern archaeology, regular contributor to Science and Archaeology 
Magazine
Carol Lewis—U.S. professor of political science with a focus on the ethics of 
public service
Roger MacGinty—U.K. professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the 
Humanitarian and Conflict Resolution Institute with a focus on 
international peace-support interventions and local reactions to these 
interventions
Lawrence Rothfield—Professor of English and comparative literature, as well 
as co-founder of the University of Chicago’s Cultural Policy Center, 
with a focus on public good of arts, humanities, and heritage
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Samuel Schubert—Writer for the Institute for Human and Social Studies at 
the Austrian National Defense Academy
Wayne Sandholtz—U.S. political science professor with a focus on
international norms and institutions, funded by grants from the Center 
for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California
Dennis Yreeke—Canadian economist
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